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ABSTRACT
In humans, affective states can influence cognitive processes, resulting in a
phenomenon referred to as “cognitive bias”. Rodents exhibit similar biases during the
interpretation of ambiguous cues. It has been shown that cognitive bias shifts towards the
negative valence (pessimism) when animals are under chronic stress manipulations. However,
the effects of acute stress on cognitive bias have not been well established in an animal model.
Here, a non-operant appetitive task using fluid rewards and distinct visual/tactile cues was
developed to examine cognitive bias in male rats. Corticosterone was used to mimic stress
levels similar to acute restraint stress. It was shown that under basal conditions, rats exhibited
a positive cognitive bias (optimism), and that acute corticosterone administration resulted in a
shift towards negative cognitive bias (pessimism). In all, this thesis provides a novel animal
model to examine cognitive bias and the effects of acute stress manipulations.
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INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1 Affective Cognition
Human emotional states have a major influence on cognitive processes, specifically
in the way information is processed and decisions are made. For example, when we are
feeling angry, we may lash out and act irrationally. Cognition can be understood as the way
by which we process and act on the information from the environment (Paul, Harding, &
Mendl, 2005). This process involves many neurobiological processes, ranging from
sensory perception, associative learning, and cognition. Emotions, on the other hand, are
associated with physiological and neural mechanisms that allows humans to consciously
and subjectively experience the “feeling” of the emotion. In both human and non-human
animals, emotions can: i) structure perception, ii) direct attention, iii) provide preferential
attention to certain functions and meaning, and iv) alter judgements and decision making.
“Affect” is a term commonly used interchangeably with emotion, and while some
researchers will give the two terms distinct meanings, this thesis will be using them
synonymously.
Cognition and emotions are strongly linked. In particular, how information with
ambiguous emotional overtones can be perceived by an individual is determined by their
tendencies towards specific emotional valence (ie. positive or negative mood) during
cognitive processing (Richter et al., 2012). Studies of perception and memory in humans
showed that the processing of emotionally salient information has an integral role in the
production of appropriate cognitive responses (Elliott, Zahn, Deakin, & Anderson, 2011;
Schwarz, 2010). For example, individuals are likely to overestimate the likelihood of
positive, and to underestimate the likelihood of negative outcomes if they are in a happy
(or positive) mood, with the reverse occurring for individuals who are in a sad mood (see
Nygren, Isen, Taylor, & Dulin, 1996). This propensity to base cognitive evaluations and
decisions on the associated emotional tendency (e.g. “How did I feel about this?”) is
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specifically termed “affective cognition”. It can be defined as the interface by which
emotional and cognitive processes integrate to generate behavior (Elliott et al., 2011).

1.1.1

Positive and Negative Cognitive Biases
When mood valences (i.e. positive or negative mood) bias the way emotionally

ambiguous information is cognitively interpreted and processed, the resultant changes in
affective cognition are called “cognitive biases”. Under these emotional influences,
affective cognition can lead to either positive or negative cognitive biases. As such, this
fluid relationship between affect-influenced expectation and actual outcome is one of the
defining features of cognitive bias. Positive and negative cognitive biases occur as the
result of a difference between the expectation and the resultant outcome. If the expectation
is more positive than the outcome, the bias is termed “positive cognitive bias”; the opposite
is true if the expectation is more negative than the outcome.
In positive cognitive bias, there is typically a significant overestimation of the
likelihood for positive events and underestimation of negative events (Sharot, 2011). Such
trends can be seen in novel situations requiring probability evaluation and choice making.
Positive cognitive bias is one of the most prevalent biases documented and is typically used
synonymously with the term “Optimism bias”. In general, healthy humans display an
overall positive cognitive bias when facing an ambiguous situation. For example, we
typically underestimate our chances of being in a car accident, or having a serious illness.
At the same time, we might overestimate our likelihood of winning the lottery, or success
in our respective career paths. It has been proposed that positive cognitive bias occurs
because a positive affective state typically calls on positive memories in thinking and
decision-making. An individual who is happy can retrieve thoughts about the positive
aspects of a neutral situation more readily, leading to a more favorable evaluation and
behavioral outcome (Isen, 2001; Nygren et al., 1996). As well, because having a positive
cognitive bias is also associated with a motivation to maintain this positive state,
individuals tend to be more conservative in choosing riskier options when there is a
potential of loss (Arkes, Herren, & Isen, 1988). Therefore, positive emotions interact with
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cognition during evaluations of emotionally ambiguous information to create and maintain
a positive cognitive bias. A positive cognitive bias has a highly beneficial effect on
physical and mental health by decreasing stress and anxiety, reducing recovery time after
major illness, as well as promoting a healthy lifestyle (Kivimäki et al., 2005; Sharot, 2011).
It is widely accepted that positive cognitive bias is advantageous in comparison to an
unbiased cognition.
Results of studies on positive cognitive bias have shed light on the mechanisms and
outcomes of its opponent, negative cognitive bias (used synonymously with the term
“pessimism”). This is crucial in the healthcare field because of one large population of
humans who do not show positive cognitive bias: those with stress related neuropsychiatric
mood disorders (i.e. depression and anxiety disorders). Clinical depression and anxiety are
common stress-related psychiatric disorders that are associated with impaired interpersonal
abilities, extensive emotional distress, and significant psychological impairments (Ingram,
Trenary, Odom, Berry, & Nelson, 2007). These are considered two of the most common
affective disorders, and the disruption of affective processing constitutes a core aspect of
these psychiatric disorders. While positive cognitive bias is a common trait in healthy
humans, a negative cognitive bias seems to take over in these mood disorders. According
to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM V), negative cognitive
bias (or “pessimism”) is one of the key symptoms of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD).
A seminal study by Strunk et al. (2006) correlated individuals’ optimism and pessimism
levels with their scores on the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) test, a highly reliable
and valid measure of depressive symptoms (Strunk, Lopez, & DeRubeis, 2006). A higher
BDI-II score indicated a greater severity of depressive symptoms. It was found that healthy
individuals, who scored low on the BDI-II, have a generally positive prediction of the
future, or an “optimism bias”. On the other hand, individuals who scored in the middle of
the BDI-II scale exhibited more of an unbiased cognition, and individuals who scored high
on depressive symptoms exhibited a negative cognitive bias, or often referred to in
literature as “pessimism bias” (Strunk et al., 2006).
It has been well established that a negative affective state alters thinking processes
in reaction to certain stimuli, and presents a major factor in the maintenance and etiology
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of affective disorders. In fact, there is a strong correlation between negative affective state
and a high risk of relapse/recurrence of depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979;
Bouhuys, Geerts, & Gordijn, 1999; Kloke et al., 2014). Depressed individuals display a
high level of hopelessness and a distorted negative perception of self/others, the world, and
their future (Beck et al., 1979; Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974). They tend to
have a more pessimistic outlook/attitude in comparison to healthy controls, in addition to
superior efficiency and thoroughness when they process negative information (Beck,
Riskind, Brown, & Steer, 1988; Dozois & Dobson, 2001). For example, these individuals
displayed a faster response toward negative faces during emotional categorization tasks
where the valence of affective stimuli, positive or negative facial expressions, were
presented (Yoon, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2009). They would also interpret ambiguous
statements (e.g. “That’s an interesting choice of outfit”) and ambiguous homophones (e.g.
die/dye, pain/pane) in a more negative (“pessimistic”) manner than the controls (Eysenck,
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1987). During interpretation of ambiguous scrambled sentences
(e.g. “winner born I am a loser”), depressed individuals would perceive the more negative
interpretation (as “I am a born loser”) rather than the positive (“I am a born winner”) (Amir,
Beard, & Bower, 2005; Wells & Matthews, 1996).
While positive/negative affective state and optimism/pessimism, respectively, are
often used interchangeably in literature, it is understood that they are independent and are
sometimes used specifically. Optimism/pessimism are key indicators of positive and
negative affective states respectively, but these affective states does not exclusively lead to
optimism or pessimism. However, since the purpose of this thesis is to examine affective
state in terms of affective cognition, these two terms will be used interchangeably here.
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1.2

Evaluating Affective States in Non-Human Animals

Evaluations of affective states in humans relies mostly on subjective languagebased measures, such as self-reporting or verbal communication. However, such direct
measurements of these subjective experiences are not applicable in animals. Currently
methodologies for evaluating affective states in animals, specifically rodents, have largely
been based on extrapolations of behavioral and physiological measures. By utilizing
specific “indicators” of stress and anxiety, these methods have been effective in evaluating
the intensity of emotion, and the level of arousal in the animals. Common evaluations have
included observations of approach/avoidance behaviors (considered to be indicative of
anxiety-like behaviors and basic emotions) and measurements of stress markers associated
with hypothalamic-pituitary adrenal (HPA) axis activity (Paul et al., 2005).
Based on the widely-accepted belief that animals do experience sufferings or
pleasure, these indicators are important in animal welfare research, as affective states are
typically used as representations of animals’ well-being (Mendl, 2008). For instance,
animals can grow in what appears to be perfect physical health, yet still subjectively
“suffer” from the lack of mobile space or stable housing. Thus, due to the nature of the
field, most of the animal welfare studies have focused on examining improved animal
welfare by studying indicators of a positive affective state. Environmental enrichment is a
widely accepted method to enhance positive affect states in laboratory animals. Some
commonly used environmental enrichment manipulations typically included adding
physical resources (e.g. play wheels, chewing wood blocks) or cognitive stimulations (e.g.
introducing cage-mates to increase social interactions; Simpson & Kelly, 2011).
Behaviorally, it has been found that animals (specifically rodents) demonstrate superior
ability to perform and learn tasks, and show a decrease in poor welfare behaviors (i.e.
aggression). These results can be attributed to either the positive stimulations or the
prevention of the development of negative emotions (for review see Boissy et al., 2007).
However, the use and interpretation of these measures is limited and difficult in
animals, as they cannot always give an accurate depiction of emotional valence (i.e.
whether the animal is in a positive or negative affective state). For instance, HPA axis
activity is often measured by examining the level of plasma corticosteroids and other
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markers as an index of stress, where higher levels of these markers indicate elevated stress.
However, these markers tend to represent fleeting changes or symptoms, and thus
incorrectly indicate long term sufferings when they are actually in a temporary state of
distress (Rushen, 1986). Another drawback to this method is the fact that HPA axis activity
can increase in either positive (e.g. sexual reproduction) or negative (e.g. confronting a
predator) situations, making an accurate assessment of the emotional valences difficult
(Michael Mendl, Burman, Parker, & Paul, 2009). Therefore, since the relationship between
emotional states and physiological/behavioral measures are not always clear, the
extrapolation and interpretation of these measures to infer an emotional state is typically
limited and unreliable. Considerations must be given to alternative methods to measure
affective states in animals. A more objective and standardized method is needed in order
to examine emotional processes and to clearly elucidate specific changes in animals’
affective states.

1.2.1

Applications of Cognitive Bias in Non-Human Animals
With the increasing understanding of cognitive bias through human studies, animal

welfare research found that it can be used in non-human animals as well. From human
studies, it has been well established that as an indicator for affective states, cognitive bias
allows for discrimination between emotional valences (i.e. positive and negative moods).
This presents a valuable and clear evaluation of how specific emotion can affect cognition
and behavior. Thus, cognitive bias can be assessed by utilizing the anatomical,
physiological, and behavioral similarities in cognitive and affective processes between
humans and common laboratory animals. As part of animal welfare research, changes in
cognitive bias have been examined on chronic scales as an index of affective states in
animals (such as Brilot et al., 2010; Burman et al., 2009; Harding et al., 2004; Salmeto et
al., 2011). Cognitive bias has been studied in a wide range of species, such as in honeybees
(Bateson, Desire, Gartside, & Wright, 2011), chicks (Salmeto et al., 2011), starlings (Brilot
et al., 2010), dogs (Kis, Hernadi, Kanizsar, Gacsi, & Topal, 2015; Michael Mendl et al.,
2010), rhesus macaques (Bethell, Holmes, MacLarnon, & Semple, 2012), and rodents
(Burman et al., 2009). A common method used to establish cognitive bias is to first train
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the animals to distinguish between two reference conditions, a “positive condition” and a
“negative condition”. These two reference conditions are typically represented by distinct
and opposite cues (e.g. color, sound, tactile) that are reinforced with specific positive or
negative outcomes (e.g. highly rewarding chocolate versus aversive quinine-soaked food
pellets, etc). Once the animals have learned the two distinct conditions, they are then
subjected to different affective manipulations, such as environmental enrichment or
unstable housing. These conditions are designed to elicit either positive or negative mood
in the animals. Animals are then exposed to a third “ambiguous” condition where the cues
are intermediate to the trained reference conditions. The animals’ responses to these cues
are taken as indicators of their mood. Operationally, a negative (or “pessimistic”) response
would show an increased likelihood of responding to the ambiguous cues with a prediction
of a negative outcome, and a positive (or “optimistic”) response would be opposite. It has
been proposed that a further breakdown of a response indicative of a negative affective
state may entail an increased anticipation of the negative outcome, and/or a decreased
anticipation of the positive outcome (Bateson et al., 2011; Matheson, Asher, & Bateson,
2008).
These studies have shown that while the baseline affective state is represented by a
positive cognitive bias, negative affective states tend to shift it to a negative cognitive bias
(Chaby et al., 2013; Papciak, Popik, Fuchs, & Rygula, 2013). Animals undergoing chronic
mild stress related manipulations have shown a shift in their interpretation of ambiguous
stimuli towards a more negative manner. These manipulations have included events such
as unstable housing (i.e. Unpredictable light/dark cycles, sudden noises, irregular food and
water delivery, etc.) and the absence of environmental enrichment (i.e. isolation). For
example, rats chronically housed in unstable housing have shown a decreased response to
an ambiguous stimulus that signaled a positive outcome (Harding et al., 2004). As well,
rats subjected to social isolation showed a decrease in anticipation for a highly palatable
sucrose reward that persisted up to 3 months after the cessation of the social isolation (Von
Frijtag et al., 2000). Taken together, these results suggest that chronically stressed rats
show a shift towards a negative cognitive bias by exhibiting increased expectation of a
negative outcome, or a decreased expectation of a positive outcome. This further confirms
the application of cognitive biases as indices of affect state in animals.
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1.2.2

Development of a Cognitive Bias Model in Rodents
The development of an animal model that could effectively elucidate theses

subjective changes in cognitive bias is still in its infancy. Harding et al. (2004) were the
first to examine how affective state influences cognitive bias in rodents. Chronic mild stress
was used to induce a negative affective state, and the manner in which it changed rats’
responses to ambiguous stimuli was examined. They adopted a go/no-go task format,
where rats either had to make an active choice in response to one stimuli, or to refrain from
taking an action in response to a different stimulus. Specifically, rats were trained to press
a lever when they heard a tone associated with a positive event (receive a food pellet),
which represented the positive condition. In contrast, during the negative condition, the
rats had to ignore the lever to avoid a negative event (white noise) when they heard a
different tone. Once the appropriate responses were learned, the rats were placed in
unpredictable housing environments for a prolonged period of time to elicit a mild
“depression”-like state. This included random daily interventions that were aversive to rats,
such as damp bedding and reversal of light/dark cycles. The rats were then exposed to
unfamiliar (“ambiguous”) tones that had frequencies intermediate to the two training tones.
The animals demonstrated negative or positive cognitive biases that gave indications to
their affective states. Chronically stressed rats showed slower response times, as well as
lower responses to tones that were closer to the positively reinforced (food related) tone,
indicating a negative cognitive bias, or “pessimism” (Harding et al., 2004). On the other
hand, control rats that did not receive the stress manipulations displayed a positive
cognitive bias. This paradigm was able to successfully show how pessimistic rats tend to
have a negative interpretation of ambiguous events, which was partly consistent with that
of depressed or anxious humans. Therefore, it demonstrated the potential to be adapted for
assessing both the positive and the negative affective states in animal welfare. In order to
further understand the underlying neurobiological basis of cognitive bias in affective
neuropsychiatric disorders, there is a need to develop a reliable and objective non-human
animal test.
Although this work by Harding et al. (2004) in the development of a cognitive bias
task allowed for the interpretation of non-human animals’ affective states, there was no
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evidence for an enhanced anticipation of the negative event, which is another key indicator
of a negative affective state. Further, the nature of this original go/no-go task presents a
problem in the interpretation of the results, where it is difficult to distinguish go or no-go
as an active response or an active omission. A go-go task was suggested to resolve these
problems, as it requires an active response from the animals to both the positive and
negative stimuli. This would give clear indications of specific responses that correspond to
either a positive or negative cognitive bias. Subsequent studies have built upon the initial
Harding et al (2004) study and used variants of food-reward paradigms to further develop
animal models of cognitive bias. For example, Matheson, Asher, & Bateson (2008)
developed a choice procedure in the form of a go-go task. European starlings were first
trained to discriminate between 2 different lengths of light cues as the positive (2 seconds)
and negative (10 seconds) conditions. Two distinct colors were used at two separate choice
buttons that birds could peck to receive reinforcements. During the positive condition,
instant food delivery was given if the bird pecked at one choice button, and delayed food
delivery was given if the bird pecked at the other choice button during the negative
condition. Then, the birds were placed into enriched and unenriched housing environments
for 2 weeks, followed by the evaluation of their affective states. During the evaluation, they
were exposed to light cues ranging between 2 and 10 seconds as the intermediate
“ambiguous” stimuli (e.g. 5 seconds). A positive cognitive bias was indicated by the bird
choosing to peck at the colored button associated with the positive condition (instant food
delivery) following the ambiguous light cue. Results showed that non-enriched birds had a
lower association of the intermediate light duration to the positive outcome (instant food
delivery). In comparison, the enriched birds showed a higher expectation of the positive
condition when the ambiguous cue was given. These results demonstrated a shift in
cognitive bias following affective manipulations towards the positive valence. Further,
because animals had to respond actively to both the positive and negative stimuli to receive
food rewards, the ambiguity of whether there were any reductions in motivation and
general activity was eliminated (Matheson et al., 2008). These results, along with a number
of ensuing studies (Chaby et al., 2013; Kloke et al., 2014; Mendl et al., 2010; Salmeto et
al., 2011, etc), not only established the effectiveness in using cognitive bias, but also
confirmed the value of a go-go task format to discriminate distinct emotional valences.
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Although the use of cognitive bias in animal welfare has provided a valuable and
objective measure of animals’ affective states, they’ve primarily been used with chronic
manipulations to mimic welfare-related issues for animals in captivity. In comparison, very
little research has been done on short-term mood manipulations, such as acute stress
challenge. Burman and colleagues (2009) used a food reward choice procedure and spatial
location cues in an eight-arm radial maze to examine the effect of short-term emotional
state manipulation on rats. Only five arms were used, where two reference arms contained
the positive and negative goals, flanked by 3 ambiguous locations. The reward location
(black circle) contained highly palatable food pellet, whereas the aversive location (white
circle) contained a pellet soaked in quinine (aversive to rats). The locations were paired
with high or low light levels. After the rats learned to differentiate between the two
reference locations, they were allowed access to only the three middle locations. Light
intensity was used to induce short-term stress during this stage, where brighter light
intensities generated more anxiety than darkness. This led to differential reactions towards
the ambiguous stimuli. It was found that increased anxiety (brighter lights) led to negative
cognitive bias, and a decrease in the speed by which the rats reach the goal. However, it
was also found that, while the rats demonstrated clear differences in their cognitive bias
under different anxiety levels (ie. brighter light inducing higher stress levels), the locations
in the open arms maze were too easily distinguishable by the rats. Specifically, the angles
by which the arms were placed in relation to each other may have presented the three
middle locations similarly as containing unknown outcomes rather than distinct ambiguous
locations (Burman et al., 2009). It has been suggested that an open-arena may resolve this
issue (Burman et al., 2009; Richter et al., 2012). This study confirmed the use of cognitive
bias in evaluating changes in affective states following acute manipulations, in addition to
chronic manipulations typically seen before.
In response to this development, Brydges and colleagues (2011) were the first to
adopt a semi-open arena paradigm containing olfactory cues to model a shift toward an
increase in optimism as result of environmental enrichment in rats. Rats were first trained
to associate a specific coarseness of sandpaper with specific olfactory and visual cues on
positive and negative trials. In the positive trial, coarse sandpaper was paired with a
chocolate reward (high reward value) in a cinnamon-scented bowl on the left side of the
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open arena. On the other hand, in the negative trial, fine sandpaper was paired with a lessrewarding cheerio in a coriander-scented bowl on the opposite side of the open arena. When
the rats learned to distinguish between the positive and the negative trials, their responses
toward an intermediate sandpaper coarseness (ambiguous stimuli) were assessed before
and after one week of environmental enrichment. While the unenriched rats stayed in the
original cages, the enriched rats were moved to larger cages that had deep wood shavings
and a slew of physical enrichment tools (e.g. cardboard tubes, cardboard houses, and
wooden blocks). It was found that both enriched and the unenriched rats showed similar
levels of optimism (choosing the location previously paired with the chocolate) pretreatment. However, the enriched rats showed significantly more optimistic responses after
environmental enrichment. In comparison, the control rats (no environmental enrichment)
maintained a baseline level of optimism throughout the experiment. These results
demonstrated that chronic positive manipulations can induce a shift towards a more
positive affective state, further confirming the advantage of using cognitive bias to tease
out emotional valences. More importantly, these results also suggested the effectiveness of
developing a task in an open arena to evaluate cognitive bias (Brydges, Leach, Nicol,
Wright, & Bateson, 2011).
In all, because animal welfare issues tend to exist on a long term scale with
consistent mild negative experiences, animal models of cognitive bias have been based on
a chronic time scale. To date, there is still very little research on the effect of acute stress
in cognitive bias, but it needs to be examined in order to further our understanding of the
neurobiological basis for cognitive bias (Chaby et al., 2013; Papciak et al., 2013). An open
arena, when combined with ambiguous cues, has shown to be effective in portraying
positive cognitive bias in rats following chronic manipulations. Thus, it would be
worthwhile to examine the effects of acute stress manipulation on cognitive bias with an
ambiguous cue go/go task in an open arena.
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1.3

Rationale, Hypothesis, and Objectives

Therefore, the rationale for this thesis was founded upon three major premises:
1. Stress and anxiety have a negative effect on cognitive bias, leading to

pessimistic behavioural outcomes in chronic stress studies.
2. There is currently very little research on the effects of acute stress on cognitive

bias
3. The development of the cognitive bias animal model is still in its infancy.

The present paradigm used highly salient spatial location cues to model cognitive
bias in adult rats. These stimuli (texture and visual information) greatly increased the ease
by which rats learned to discriminate between the positive and negative contextual
visual/tactile cues (see Brydges N. M., 2011 for a similar group approach). This paradigm
also overcame a key limitation from previous cognitive bias models by using an open
testing arena to ensure that the rats avoid viewing all the ambiguous choice spouts
similarly, as one collective “ambiguous outcome”, but instead viewing them as distinct
ambiguous choice locations (Burman et al., 2009). More importantly, unlike the initial
go/no-go tasks, this paradigm required active responses to the ambiguous contextual
visual/tactile cues, eliminating the difficulty of interpreting no-go responses. Therefore, in
view of the limitations of prior investigations of cognitive bias, a new animal model that
could be rapidly utilized was developed using rats. This first involved the establishment of
a task that can be used to show changes in cognitive bias in response to ambiguous cues.
In addition, the effects of an acute stress challenge by the administration of a
physiologically relevant level of corticosterone, was examined. We hypothesized that an
acute stress challenge will lead to a shift in baseline positive cognitive bias to a
negative cognitive bias.
Specifically, the cognitive bias paradigm was adapted from that of Brydges et al
(2011) to model changes in affective states following acute manipulations. The first
objective (chapter 2) was to develop a cognitive bias paradigm using visual and tactile cues
paired with an appetitive/ingestion task. This task was designed in an open arena apparatus
to examine changes in the rats’ behaviors following exposure to ambiguous visual/tactile
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cues, and to establish the validity of such a task in evaluating cognitive bias. Rats learned
to associate specific visual and tactile cues with either reward/neutral or neutral/aversive
outcomes presented in lickometer spouts. Rewarding and neutral reinforcements was used
because they have been found to be the most ideal for detecting positive affect (Mendl et
al., 2009). Cognitive bias was measured by the response of the rats during ambiguous trials,
which consisted of the presentation of intermediate visual and tactile cues. The proximity
association between the ambiguous choice spouts to the previously paired reference
locations (higher or lower reward value outcomes) allowed the generalized interpretation
of the choices to be that of “optimistic” or “pessimistic”. The second objective (chapter 3)
was to demonstrate that similarly valenced, but distinct, emotional states may be
differentiated through this paradigm. Here, the rats’ responses to the environmental cues
following an acute stress challenge was evaluated using the intraperitoneal administration
of a physiologically relevant level of corticosterone. In chapter 4, the two components of
the ambiguous condition, ambiguous environmental cues versus ambiguous choice
location cues, were separated to examine whether they work together or independently
during the evaluation of cognitive bias shifts. It was predicted that under ambiguous
conditions, rats without any affect manipulations would display a tendency towards
positive cognitive bias in our apparatus. As well, with an acute “stress” manipulation
(corticosterone injection), the baseline optimism would shift towards pessimism.
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2

DEVELOPMENT OF A COGNITIVE BIAS TASK

2.1 Introduction
There is a close relationship between cognition and emotions of affective states.
The way information is perceived by an individual is determined by their underlying
tendencies towards specific emotional valence (i.e. whether individual is in a positive or
negative mood) during cognitive processing (Richter et al., 2012). When underlying
emotional valences bias the way ambiguous information is interpreted and processed, the
resultant changes in affective cognition is termed “cognitive bias” (Hales, Stuart,
Anderson, & Robinson, 2014). If the expectation is more positive than the outcome, the
bias is a positive cognitive bias; conversely, it is a negative cognitive bias if the expectation
is negative. In humans, the evaluation of affective cognition and cognitive bias is largely
based on verbal self-reporting, with such information being generally accepted as an
accurate indicator of affective states. In general, healthy humans display an overall positive
(optimistic) cognitive bias when facing an ambiguous situation, where the likelihood of
positive events are overestimated and the likelihood of negative events underestimated
(Sharot, 2011). This baseline positive cognitive bias has also been widely established in
animal models as part of animal welfare research. By utilizing the anatomical,
physiological, and behavioral similarities in cognitive and affective processes between
humans and common laboratory animals, one can assess the underlying processes in
cognitive bias using non-human animals (for discussion see section 1.1.3). However, the
development of animal models to examine changes in affective states are still in its infancy.
So, in order to further understand the underlying neurobiological basis of cognitive bias in
affective neuropsychiatric disorders, there is a need to develop a reliable and objective nonhuman animal test.
The examination of affective states in animals has been established since the
pioneering work by Harding, et al, 2004, mostly as part of animal welfare research by using
chronic stress manipulations. Typically, a task used to evaluate cognitive bias first
establishes two distinct reference conditions, a “positive condition” and a “negative
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condition”. These two reference conditions are typically indicated by distinct and opposite
cues (e.g. color, sound, tactile) and specific positive or negative reinforcements (e.g. highly
rewarding chocolate versus aversive quinine-soaked food pellets, etc). Once the animals
have learned to distinguish between the two reference conditions, they are then subjected
to different affective manipulations, such as environmental enrichment or unstable
housing. These conditions are designed to elicit either positive or negative mood in the
animals. Animals are then exposed to an “ambiguous” condition where the cues are
intermediate to the trained reference conditions. The animals’ responses to these cues are
taken as indicators of their mood. A negative (or “pessimistic”) response will show an
increased likelihood of responding to the ambiguous cues with a prediction of a negative
outcome, and a positive (or “optimistic”) response would be the opposite. It has been
proposed that a response indicative of a negative affective state may entail an increased
anticipation of the negative outcome or punishment, and/or a decreased anticipation of the
positive outcome (Bateson et al., 2011; Matheson et al., 2008).
Using this general framework, studies have shown that while the animals’ baseline
affective state is represented by a positive cognitive bias, negative affective states tend to
shift cognitive bias to a negative valence in response to ambiguous stimuli (Burman et al.,
2009; Hales et al., 2014; Harding et al., 2004; etc). For example, Harding et al (2004)
developed a cognitive bias task that allowed for the interpretation of rodents’ affective
states following chronic stress manipulations. However, the nature of this original go/nogo task presents a problem in the interpretation of the results. Such a task creates difficulties
in distinguishing go/no-go as an active response or an active omission. A go-go task would
resolve this problem, as it requires an active response from the animals to both the positive
and negative stimuli. As well, by requiring active responses for both stimuli, potential
problems like motivation and general activity reductions could also be minimized
(Matheson et al., 2008).
Ensuing studies have improved upon this pioneering work to further develop tasks
of cognitive bias that can objectively elucidate animals’ affective state. Through these
studies, it has been shown that cognitive bias can accurately show specific shifts in
emotional valences (positive or negative affective states) from the baseline “optimism” that
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is typically seen in humans. For example, environmental enrichment (i.e. adding physical
play toys or social cage mates) shifts cognitive bias to a more positive valence than in the
baseline. In contrast, unstable housing (i.e. irregular lighting schedule, damp bedding, etc)
leads to a shift in cognitive bias towards the negative valence. Despite these advances, there
are still a number of limitations for using cognitive bias to accurately measure affective
states in non-human animals. One important issue is that animal welfare research typically
studied changes in mood on a chronic scale, where affective manipulations (e.g.
environmental enrichment or stressful housing) occur on the scale of weeks to months
(Burman, Parker, Paul, & Mendl, 2008). In contrast, there is relatively little research on the
effects of acute stress on shifts in affective states. One such study was done by Burman and
colleagues (2009), where a go-go task in an eight-arm radial maze was used to examine the
effect of short-term emotional state manipulation. Ambiguous cues at specific locations
were used to test changes in cognitive bias. While rats did demonstrate shifts in affective
states under different anxiety levels (ie. brighter light inducing higher stress levels), it was
found that the locations in the open arms maze were too easily distinguished by the rats.
Thus, it was suggested that an open arena might be used for testing (Burman et al., 2009;
Richter et al., 2012).
Therefore, in order to examine the effect of acute stress challenge on cognitive bias
shift, a novel rat model of cognitive bias using visual and tactile cues in an open arena
apparatus was first developed. Ambiguous visual/tactile cues were used to test shifts in
cognitive bias. In groups, rats first learned to associate specific visual and tactile cues with
either a positive or a negative condition. Rewarding and neutral enforcements were used
because they have been found to be the most ideal to elicit positive affect (Michael Mendl
et al., 2009). Cognitive bias was then measured by the response of the rats during
ambiguous trials, which consisted of the presentation of intermediate visual and tactile
cues. It was hypothesized that without any affect manipulations, rats would display a
positive cognitive bias in the ambiguous testing cue task.
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2.2 Materials and Methods

2.2.1

Animals
Twelve adult male Long-Evans rats (Charles River, Quebec, Canada), weighing

between 300 - 450g at the start of the experiment were used. The rats were pair housed in
standard polypropylene cages (45cm × 22cm × 20cm), in a colony room with ad libitum
access to both food (ProLab RMH3000 rat chow) and tap water when applicable. The
colony room was maintained at 21± 2°C, on a 12:12 hour light/dark cycle with the lights
on from 07:00 to 19:00 h. All experiments were carried out during the light phase. For the
entire duration of the experiment, each rat was water deprived for 15 hours starting at the
beginning of their dark cycle (starting at 19:00h), and then given one-and-a-half-minute
access to tap water at the end of the water deprivation period. The rats were observed during
the one-and-a-half-minute water access to ensure that each rat drank from the water bottle.
This method was used so that rats would be motivated to explore and drink from the liquid
reinforcements that were used to indicate differences between positive and negative
conditions. Each rat was given identification markings on their tails using a permanent
marker (Black Sharpie pen). All procedures were performed according to the Canadian
Council on Animal Care guidelines and were approved by the Western University Animal
Care Committee.

2.2.2

Cognitive Bias Apparatus
The apparatus consisted of a rectangular start box (20cm x 20cm) attached to a

rectangular arena (100cm long, 90cm wide, 25cm height) made of clear Plexiglas with a
transparent lid, set on top of a white board (fig. 2.1). A manually operated transparent
guillotine door opened into the arena from the start box. This apparatus was set up in a
designated testing room, on a table 1m above floor level. The wall colors of the open arena
were created using white or black cardboards, attached to the outside of the clear Plexiglas.
Plastic lighting sheets (2’×2’ Replacement lens for Metalux Recessed Troffer, Cooper
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Lighting, GA, USA) were used to line the floor of the arena to create rough floors, and the
smooth back of the sheets were used to create smooth floors. All behaviours were
videotaped with a video camera positioned approximately 1.5 m directly above the
apparatus on the ceiling.
Five automated lickometers, each consisting of a stainless steel spout attached to a
glass graduated drinking tube, were used (Contact 108 lick analysis system, Dilog
Instruments, Tallahassee, Fl). The ends of the drinking spouts were mounted 5cm above
the arena floor. The 5 spouts were evenly spaced 15cm apart from each other, as well as
from the sides of the apparatus, on the opposite side to the start box (Fig. 2.1 and 2.2). The
two outer spouts were designated “reference locations”, and were used during the training
stage (described in section 2.2.3). Each spout was centered on a specific colored cue card
that could be changed to give different visual cues. The spouts were accessible through an
oval opening, only big enough for the rats’ tongues without altering the natural facial
movements of drinking. To monitor the licks, a computer-controlled lickometer (DiLog
instruments, Tallahassee, FL) passed a low, non-detectable current (~60nA) through the
spouts. The electric circuit was completed each time the rat’s tongue came into contact
with the spout, and the signals were amplified before being recorded for licking measures
(QLick, version 4.0). These recordings allowed for the analysis of the rats’ licking
frequency. The volume of solutions consumed was also quantified by manually reading the
changes in fluid amounts of the graduated drinking tubes.
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Figure 2.1. Photograph of the cognitive bias apparatus, five lickometer spouts (top)
are evenly space apart on the far wall of the apparatus, each centered on a visual cue card.

Figure 2.2. Diagram of the cognitive bias apparatus, showing the dimensions of the
start box (20cm x 20cm) and the open testing arena (100cm long, 90cm wide, 25cm
height). The light grey lines at the right side of the diagram indicate the locations of the
lickometer drinking spouts.
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2.2.3

Experimental Procedure

All of the procedures are summarized in figure 2.3. Details of each stage are provided
below.

Handling
and
Training
Handle: 10min/day,
5days
Training
(In randomized and
counterbalanced
groups):
30 min alternations (2
hrs total; 5days)
between:
Negative conditions

 white walls, smooth
flooring
 stripe cue card: higher
reward reference
location (water)
 white cue card:
aversive reference
location (0.00005M
Quinine solution)

Positive Conditions

 black walls, rough
flooring
 Stripe cue card:
higher reward
reference location
(sucrose/saccharin
solution)
 white cue card: lower
reward value
reference location
(water)

Establish
Reference
Conditions
Time: 5 days
Tested
Individually

4 randomized
trials (2 reward
and 2 aversive
conditions)
Recorded:
 Latency to
make a
choice
 Choices
made

Move on to
testing stage if
successful on 3
out of 4 trials

Training for Cognitive Bias
Figure 2.3. Outline of procedures for experiment 1.

Cognitive Bias
Test with
Ambiguous Cue
Time: 3 days
Same procedure as
stage 2, with an
additional
“Ambiguous” trial
using intermediate
contextual cues:
 Grey walls and an
insert sheet
(intermediate
grain)
 Only middle 3
“ambiguous”
locations exposed
with water spouts.
 Positive affective
state (“Optimistic”)
if chose location
closest to the
reward location.
 Negative affective
state
(“Pessimistic”) if
chose location
closest to the
aversive location.
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2.2.4

Stage 1 – Handling and Training
During the first 5 days of the experiment, each rat was handled daily for 10 minutes

during the light phase. 24 hours after the final handling day and for the subsequent 5 days,
all of the rats were placed into the open arena in groups of 6 for training. Group learning
facilitates the acquisition of cognitive tasks more effectively and efficiently than individual
training (Krasheninnikova & Schneider, 2014). During this time, visual (black or white
walls) and tactile (smooth or rough flooring) cues were placed in the arena to indicate the
positive or negative condition. As well, visual cue cards (black-and-white stripe or white)
were used to indicate the higher/lower reference location spouts, respectively. These two
reference locations were located at the outermost 2 locations out of the 5 possible locations;
they were 15cm from the sides of the goal box, and 60cm apart from each other.
The rats alternated between a “positive” condition and a “negative” condition for
30 minutes each, for a total of 2 hours a day in groups. The positive condition was
represented by environmental cues consisting of black walls and a rough floor. Here, a
highly palatable sucrose/saccharin solution (3% sucrose with 0.125% saccharin dissolved
in distilled water) represented the higher reward-value choice location (associated with the
black-and-white stripe visual cue card), whereas tap water represented the lower reward
value choice location (associated with the white visual cue card; figure 2.4a). In contrast,
the negative condition was represented by environmental cues consisting of white walls
and a smooth floor. Here, a quinine solution (0.00005M) represented an aversive reference
location (associated with the white visual cue card), whereas tap water represented a
comparably higher value reference location (associated with a black-and-white visual cue
card; Figure 2.4b). The concentration of quinine used in this task was a very low
concentration, so that rats would find it aversive but not so much as to cause stress or major
changes in appetitive behaviour. The reward and aversive reference locations were
counterbalanced between rats to eliminate side-bias. The specific reference locations paired
with a particular visual and tactile condition environment were consistent for each rat
throughout the experiment (ie. sucrose/saccharin solution were always at the right side of
the goal box).
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On the other hand, the 3 middle locations (figure 2.4) were blocked off by a smooth
board with a color that was the same as the walls, thus leaving only the 2 reference location
spouts exposed. All rats in the group had free access to explore both reference locations
(and the accompanying lickometer spouts) in the arena during this stage (figure 2.4). Since
all rats were identified by an ID marking on their tails, their exploration and consumption
of the various reference fluids were verified by video recording.

a)

b)

Figure 2.4. Diagram of training apparatuses in either positive (a) or negative (b)
condition. a) The rough floor and black walls (positive) environment was reinforced with
the higher value sucrose/saccharin solution (3% sucrose and 0.125% saccharin dissolved
in distilled water) at the left side of the goal box (stripe cue card) and tap water on the
right side (white cue card). b) The smooth floor and white walls (negative) environment
was associated with the lower value water at the left side of the goal box (stripe cue card)
and 0.00005M quinine at the right side (white cue card). The middle 3 locations (light
grey lines) were blocked off by a card with the same color as the walls.

27

2.2.5

Stage 2 – Establishing reference conditions: Discrimination
between positive and negative conditions

In order to determine whether the rats had acquired the task, 24 hours after the last
training day, the rats were tested individually to see if they were able to determine the more
rewarding location in the positive and negative conditions. In this stage, each rat
individually received 4 consecutive trials in a randomized order (2 trials in the positive
condition and 2 trials in the negative condition) each day for five days. Between each trial,
the apparatus was cleaned thoroughly with 20% alcohol solution. The time taken (in
seconds) for the rat to exit the start box and choose one of two reference locations was
recorded. The specific reference location spouts that the rat chose and drank from was
recorded as well. The rat was considered to have made a correct choice if it chose to drink
from the reference location spout associated with the higher reward value outcome
immediately after exiting the start box. For the positive condition, the correct choice was
the sucrose/saccharin solution, whereas in the negative condition, the correct choice was
the water. A rat was considered to be successfully trained and could advance to the next
stage if it consistently made the correct choice at least 3 times out of the 4 trials over the 5
testing days.
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2.2.6

Stage 3 – Cognitive Bias Testing with Ambiguous Cue

24 hours following the trials to test the establishment of cognitive bias, each rat
individually received three consecutive days of cognitive bias testing with ambiguous cues.
In this stage, the trials proceeded in the same method as the previous trials, but with one
additional “ambiguous” trial included. During the ambiguous condition, an insert sheet,
intermediate in texture to the two conditioned floor textures, was used as the flooring
(Acrylic Lighting Panels Cracked Ice Clear, Plaskolite Inc., Ohio, USA). In addition, grey
cardboard was attached to the walls of the apparatus to give an intermediate wall color
(figure 2.5). These two conditions created an environment where the visual and tactile cues
were intermediate to the ones used for the training trials (i.e. black walls/rough flooring for
positive condition, white walls/smooth flooring for the negative condition).
During these trials, the individual rats were exposed to only the 3 middle
“ambiguous” locations. The two reference location spouts (for the positive and negative
context conditions) were blocked off by a card in the same shade of grey as the walls. The
graduated drinking tubes contained water, and were placed in each of the three middle
ambiguous locations (figure 2.5). Ambiguous position 1 (O1) was located 15cm to the right
of the reward reference location, while the ambiguous position 3 (P3) was located 15cm to
the left of the aversive reference location. Ambiguous location 2 (M) was in the middle,
30cm to either of the two reference locations. Measurements were made and recorded for
the: i) time taken for the rat to exit the start box, ii) first choice from the three middle
lickometer spouts. If the rat selected the O1 location, it was recorded as making a choice
reflective of a positive cognitive bias; if the P3 location was chosen, it was recorded as a
choice reflective of a negative cognitive bias (figure 2.5). 30 seconds after the rat cease to
drink from their initial choice spout, they were removed from the apparatus. During this
stage, each rat received 1 trial in the ambiguous cue condition plus 2 trials each of the
previously trained positive and the negative conditions.
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Figure 2.5. Diagram of experimental apparatuses in the ambiguous task. The
smoothness/roughness of the flooring was in between the smooth and rough flooring of
the training trials. The walls were a solid grey color. The two reference locations were
blocked off and inaccessible using a smooth board with the same grey color as the walls.
The drinking tubes of the ambiguous locations (dark grey lines) contained tap water. The
O1 ambiguous location was located closest to the previously trained more rewarding
location, whereas the P3 ambiguous location was located closest to the previously trained
less rewarding/aversive location. The M ambiguous location was in the middle between
the O1 and P3 ambiguous locations.
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2.2.7

Statistical Analysis

In this experiment, all data generated were analyzed using SPSS (Version 21, SPSS
Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). The treatment groups were equally counterbalanced across the
conditions. For the training stage, the data for correctly and incorrectly choosing the higher
reward value outcome for each condition were compared separately using the chi-square
test, as this was needed to determine when the rats were ready to proceed to the next stage.
The positive or negative choices across all three testing days during the ambiguous
condition testing were also analyzed with the chi-square test of independence. The latency
to approach choice spouts during the cognitive bias testing with ambiguous conditions were
analyzed using one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). Specifically, this measure
compared the three ambiguous locations (O1, M, and P3). All significant effects and
interactions were further examined using Tukey’s HSD. A significance level of p < 0.05
was used throughout the experiment.
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2.3 Results
2.3.1

Establish Reference Conditions
Performances during the individual trials to evaluate whether rats have learned to

choose the more rewarding location in either positive or negative conditions, were
combined across all training days for analysis (refer to section 2.2.5; figure 2.6). In the
positive condition (sucrose saccharin solution/water and black walls/rough floor), the
correct response was choosing to drink from the sucrose (more rewarding) location when
the rat exited the start box. In the negative condition (water/quinine with white
walls/smooth floor), the correct response was choosing to drink from the water (more
rewarding) location first when the rat exited the start box. Chi-square test revealed
significance between correct choices and incorrect choices, where rats made significantly
more correct choices than incorrect choices in both the positive and the negative conditions
(X2(1, n=12) = 81, p < 0.001) (Figure 2.6).

Figure 2.6. Comparison of choices that were correct vs. non-correct during the
establishment of cognitive bias trials (described in section 2.2.5). “Number of
Criterion trials” represent accumulation of all training trial results for all rats. Rats were
able to successfully make the distinction between the choices locations by choosing the
higher reward choice location in both positive (sucrose/saccharin vs. water) and negative
(water vs. quinine) conditions across all five training days. *p < 0.05
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2.3.2

Cognitive Bias Testing with Ambiguous Cues

In the ambiguous condition, there was significance between the choice for the
optimistic location (O1) to the middle (M, p < 0.01) and the pessimistic location (P3, p <
0.01). Rats chose the O1 location significantly more than the P3 location (O1, p < 0.01,
figure 2.7).
The mean latency from the time that the rat exited the start box until it made a
choice was compared among the positive, negative, and ambiguous conditions across all
three testing days (Figure 2.8). ANOVA analysis yielded a significant interaction between
the latency and the condition. Further analysis revealed a significant difference for latency
during ambiguous trials versus positive conditions (F(2, 201) = 7.265, p < 0.01), as well
as with the negative condition (F(2, 201) = 7.265, p < 0.05). Rats took significantly longer
time to make a choice in the ambiguous condition in comparison to the trained positive or
negative conditions. There was no significant difference between time spent making a
choice when the rat was exposed to the trained positive and negative conditions (p > 0.05).
The ambiguous environmental and choice location cues presented in the ambiguous
condition did have an effect on the choices made by the rat in the present paradigm.
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Figure 2.7. Choices in response to the ambiguous contextual (visual/tactile) cues.
“Number of Criterion trials” represent accumulation of all training trial results for all rats.
Choices made over three days of ambiguous cue testing are shown. There was a
significant difference between the positive choices (choosing the O1 location first) and
the negative choices (choosing the P3 location first). Rats chose the O1 location
significantly more. *p < 0.05

Figure 2.8. Latency of making a choice during the Ambiguous condition trials as
compared to during cognitive bias training in positive/negative conditions (in
seconds). In the trained conditions, higher reward locations consisted of sucrose and
water as the enforcements, while lower reward value locations consisted of water and
quinine instead. Error bars indicate S.E.M. *p < 0.05 (males: n=12).
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2.4

Discussion

The aim of this experiment was to establish a relatively rapid task to examine
cognitive bias in rats that offers advantages over previously established tasks. Here,
solutions of different reward values were used in conjunction with different visual and
tactile cues to provide indices of positive and negative cognitive biases. The results of using
this task showed that adult male rats displayed a positive cognitive bias (optimism bias)
when facing ambiguous cues under basal conditions.
Rats were first trained to discriminate between a positive and a negative condition
(using wall color and textured flooring) that were reinforced with either higher reward
value (water or sucrose/saccharin solution), or lower reward value outcomes (quinine
solution or water) choice outcomes, respectively. After the rats demonstrated a clear ability
to distinguish between the positive and the negative conditions, ambiguous cues were used
to determine whether there were any changes in the underlying cognitive bias. Both
environmental cues (grey walls and intermediate grain flooring), as well as choice location
cues (grey visual cue cards) were used to create the ambiguous condition. The results of
the present experiment showed that rats were able to accurately acquire the task under the
absence of any significant behavioral manipulations (i.e. stress induction). They were able
to correctly discriminate between the different environmental visual/tactile cues in the
positive and the negative conditions by consistently choosing the higher reward choice
spout to drink from. Upon further testing and analysis with the presentation of ambiguous
cues (intermediate textured flooring and wall color), it was found that the rats preferentially
chose the ambiguous location more closely associated with the rewarding reference
location. This suggested that rats anticipated positive outcomes when they were exposed
to affectively ambiguous cues, indicative of a positive (or “optimistic”) affective state.
Such results are consistent with previous studies that used other tasks of cognitive bias in
adult male rats and starlings, where it was found that an optimistic baseline typically exists
in animals without any mood manipulations (Brydges et al., 2011; Matheson et al., 2008).
These results suggested that the current cognitive bias model can be a highly
effective and valuable tool in the assessment of altered affective processing and emotional
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valences (i.e. positive or negative mood). This paradigm has a number of advantages over
previously established tasks. First, an open arena apparatus was adopted to overcome the
limitations presented by previous studies. This ensured that the rats avoided viewing all the
ambiguous choice locations similarly, as one collective “ambiguous outcome”, but instead
viewed them as distinct ambiguous choice locations (Burman et al., 2009). Thus, when
paired with fluid outcomes that have discrete reward values (sucrose/saccharin solution is
highly palatable, water is neutral, and quinine solution is aversive), allowed the different
locations to represent distinct significances to the rats. The proximity association between
the ambiguous choice spouts to the previously paired reference locations (higher or lower
reward value outcomes), allowed the generalized interpretation of the choices to be that of
“optimistic” or “pessimistic”. Further, unlike the initial go/no-go tasks (such as the one
presented by Harding, et al, 2004), this paradigm required active responses to the
ambiguous contextual visual/tactile cues, eliminating the difficulty of interpreting no-go
responses. As well, by requiring active responses to different conditions, problems such as
motivation or locomotor reductions could be minimized (Matheson et al., 2008). In the
Harding et al.’s task, if one result of the chronic stress manipulation was a decline in
activity level or a decreased motivation to press the lever, the observed reduction in
responses during the ambiguous condition could be confounded and inaccurate. This was
improved upon by using a go-go task format in the current model.
Another advantage of the present task was that it allowed for quick cognitive bias
testing in non-human animals without the requirement of complex processing and skills.
Specifically, it used highly salient spatial location cues (tactile and visual information) to
model cognitive bias in adult rats. These stimuli greatly increased the ease for rats to learn
to discriminate between the positive and negative contextual visual/tactile cues (see
Brydges N. M., 2011 for a similar approach). In addition, the cues and reinforcements used
allowed for the potential to titrate changes in cognitive bias with different strengths of
aversive (i.e. quinine concentration) and positive (i.e. sucrose/saccharin solution
concentration) reinforcements. Variations in these parameters can help to tease out putative
underlying mechanisms associated with the establishment of cognitive bias. Thus, the
results of the present study demonstrated that similarly valenced, but distinct, emotional
states may be differentiated through this paradigm.
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It is important to note that while the majority of rats chose the O1 location,
demonstrating a positive cognitive bias that is indicative of a positive affective state, there
were some rats that chose to drink from the P3 location. This can be attributed to a number
of variable factors. First, individual differences in responding to the task over the course of
the experiment could have affected the acquisition and performance in the cognitive bias
task. The rats were allowed to explore the apparatus for 30 seconds following the cessation
of drinking from the choice spout to avoid potential conditioned pairing of specific spouts
with handling. Since the ambiguous locations were all reinforced with water, the rats that
went on to explore the other ambiguous choices would have found that all spouts gave
equal outcomes, which may then potentially interfere with their responses in succeeding
trials. However, the presentation of water as an outcome in the ambiguous choices could
also have been a potential confounder in the ambiguous cue testing trial, depending on
whether a positive or negative condition was proceeding it (Trials with ambiguous cues
were administered in addition to a randomized order of positive and negative conditions).
Thus, because the water was trained as either the higher reward value outcome in the
negative condition or lower reward value in the positive condition, receiving water in the
ambiguous condition could have led to a biased recall of conditioned choices in the
ambiguous condition.
The differences in rats’ performances in the ambiguous cue testing could also be
attributed to the differences in acquisition of the task during the establishment of cognitive
bias stage. Although all rats were observed to ensure drinking from the water spout
following water deprivation, as well as drinking and exploring the lickometer locations
during training, individual differences could have affected how well they acquire the task
during these two stages. Further, although the use of group learning was adopted to enhance
the acquisition of the task, the hierarchal social nature of rats allows for the possibility of
stress associated with dominate versus subordinate roles. In all, the saliency and timeeffective nature of the current task presented a promising method to further elucidate
changes in cognitive bias in rats.
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3

3.1

THE EFFECT OF CORTICOSTERONE ON
COGNITIVE BIAS

Introduction

Affective disorders such as depression and anxiety are serious wide-spread medical
conditions that are complex and multi-dimensional, involving both genetic and
environmental factors. At the same time, depression and anxiety are comorbid conditions,
where symptoms of depression are often made worse by co-existing symptoms of anxiety.
These symptoms include anhedonia (decreased reward value of highly palatable foods),
irritability, sleep disturbances, nervous dread of the future, and psychomotor agitation
(Gregus, Wintink, Davis, & Kalynchuk, 2005). In fact, pure depression without symptoms
of anxiety occur infrequently, and have been widely shown to be related to stress. Stress is
a physiological response to threatening or novel stimuli, characterized by the activation of
the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis. When the HPA axis is activated, it elicits
a cascade of events leading to the elevation of adrenal glucocorticoids (Dinan, 1994). In
humans, cortisol is the circulating glucocorticoid, while corticosterone (CORT) is the
equivalence in other species, notably rats. A normal HPA response is necessary for survival
as it maintains physiological homeostasis in the body. However, when the HPA axis is
repeatedly activated, problems can arise in the body and the brain. For example, repeated
glucocorticoid exposure can lead to downregulation of hippocampal regulatory pathways,
leading to abnormal secretion of the hormone to the rest of the body (for review see Dinan,
1994). Thus, it is not surprising that depression and anxiety has been strongly associated
with elevated stress responses, in particular an increase in HPA axis activation and cortisol
levels.
One aspect of cognition that seems to be disrupted by this abnormal stress response
takes shape behaviorally as cognitive bias. In fact, it has been well established that negative
cognitive bias (or “pessimism”) is a key characteristic typically exhibited by stressed
individuals (Beck et al., 1988; Strunk et al., 2006). There is a strong correlation between
negative affective state and a high risk of relapse/recurrence of depression (Bouhuys et al.,

40

1999). These individuals tend to have negative views of self and others, as well as increased
hopelessness and more negative thoughts/attitudes in comparison to healthy controls (Beck
et al., 1988). For example, these individuals would interpret ambiguous statements (e.g.
“That’s an interesting choice of outfit”) in a more negative (“pessimistic”) manner than the
controls (Eysenck et al., 1987). As well, during emotional categorization tasks where the
valence of affective stimuli (positive or negative facial expressions) were to be categorized,
these individuals showed faster responses toward negative faces (Yoon et al., 2009). Such
negative cognitive bias is not limited to humans. In fact, non-human animals, under chronic
stress manipulations, have been shown to exhibit similar tendencies when facing
ambiguous situations (Brydges, Hall, Nicolson, Holmes, & Hall, 2012; Burman et al.,
2009; Harding et al., 2004). Therefore, there is great value in examining how negative
affective state can affect behavior in animal models to further our understanding of the
underlying neurobiological mechanisms of affective disorders. In the previous (chapter 2),
a novel task was developed using an open arena with tactile and visual cues in an attempt
to overcome some of the limitations presented by existing animal models. It was shown
that healthy rats with no significant stress influences exhibited a positive cognitive bias,
consistent with existing research. In the current study, we built upon this cognitive bias
framework by adding an acute stress manipulation to examine whether it would lead to a
similar shift to negative cognitive bias as that found in chronic stress studies.
There are a wide range of manipulations used in chronic mild stress studies that can
elicit abnormal stress responses to shift cognitive bias. The most common methods in
animal welfare research are the lack of environmental enrichment and restraint stress
(Burman et al., 2009). However, while these methods do mimic the repeated stress
exposure, they have not been able to produce consistent and robust changes in depression
symptomatology (for review, see Zhao et al., 2008). This may be attributed to procedural
differences between experiments and lack of control over individual differences in
response to manipulations (Zhao et al., 2008). As a result, there may be variable
corticosterone levels between animals when exposed to the same stressor, leading to the
inconsistency of studies on stress. As well, chronically repeated restraint stress may allow
for habituation to the adverse effects. For example, it has been shown that corticosterone
levels in male rats declined over the course of 21 days following physical restraint, where
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the levels are significantly lower on day 14 when compared to day 1 and 7 (Galea et al.,
1997). One way to avoid these problem in traditional rat stress models is by using
exogenous corticosterone administration to study the effect of elevated corticosterone
levels. In the current study, in order to examine the effect of acute stress challenge on
changes in cognitive bias, daily injections of exogenous corticosterone were administered
for three days. The dose of corticosterone was chosen because it was shown to approximate
physiological stress levels associated with aversive responses following physical restraint
(Ossenkopp et al., 2011).
Thus, the present study examined the effects of physiologically relevant levels of
corticosterone on cognitive bias. It was hypothesized that corticosterone administration
would lead to a negative (pessimistic) cognitive bias when rats face ambiguous conditions.
The ambiguous cues consisted of grey walls and intermediate grain flooring, with the 3
middle (“novel”) choice spouts open (previously inaccessible to rats). Whether the rats
chose to drink from the spout that was more closely associated with the previously paired
higher reward value outcome location, or vice versa for the lower reward value outcome
location, would give insight on how an acute stress challenge could affect cognitive bias.
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3.2
3.2.1

Materials and Methods
Experimental Procedure

Handling
and
Training
Handle: 10min/day,
5days
Training (5 days)
(In randomized and
counterbalanced
groups)
30 min alternations (2
hrs total) between:
Negative conditions
 white walls, smooth
flooring
 stripe cue card: higher
reward reference
location (water)
 white cue card:
aversive reference
location (0.00005M
Quinine solution)

Positive Conditions
 black walls, rough
flooring
 Stripe cue card:
higher reward
reference location
(sucrose/saccharin
solution)
 white cue card: lower
reward value
reference location
(water)

Establish
Reference
Conditions
Time: 5 days
Tested
Individually
4 randomized
trials (2 reward
and 2 aversive
conditions)
Recorded:
 Latency to
make a choice
 Pathlength
travelled to
choice
 Number of
licks taken at
the choice
spout
 Choices made

Move on to
testing stage if
successful on 3
out of 4 trials

Cognitive Bias
Test with
Ambiguous Cue
Time: 3 days
Same procedure as
stage 2, with an
additional
“Ambiguous” trial
using intermediate
contextual cues:
 Grey walls and an
insert sheet
(intermediate grain)
 Only middle 3
“ambiguous”
locations exposed
with water tubes.
 i.p. injection of
Corticosterone
(5mg/kg) or vehicle
(1ml/kg) given to
each rat 15 min
before testing.
 Positive affective
state (“Optimistic”)
if chose location
closest to the
reward location.
 Negative affective
state if
(“Pessimistic”) if
chose location
closest to the
aversive location.

Training for Cognitive Bias
Figure 3.1. Outline of procedures for experiment 2. Procedural differences from
experiment 1 are highlighted.
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3.2.2

Animals
Twenty-three adult male Long-Evans rats (Charles River, Quebec, Canada),

weighing between 300 - 450g at the start of the experiment were used. The rats were pair
housed in standard polypropylene cages (45cm × 22cm ×20cm), in a colony room with ad
libitum access to both food (ProLab RMH3000 rat chow) and tap water when applicable.
The colony room was maintained at 21± 2°C, on a 12:12 hour light/dark cycle with the
lights on from 07:00 to 19:00 h. All experiments were carried out during the light phase.
For the entire duration of the experiment, each rat was water deprived for 15 hours starting
at the beginning of their dark cycle (starting at 19:00h), and then given one-and-a-halfminute access to tap water at the end of the water deprivation period. The rats were
observed during the one-and-a-half-minute water access to ensure that each rat drinks from
the water bottle. This method was used so that rats would be motivated to explore and drink
from the liquid reinforcements that were used to indicate differences between positive and
negative conditions. Each rat was given identification markings on their tails using a
permanent marker (Black Sharpie pen). All procedures were performed according to the
Canadian Council on Animal Care guidelines and were approved by the Western
University Animal Care Committee.

3.2.3

Drugs
Corticosterone (Cort; Sigma, Toronto, ON) was used as the acute stress challenge,

as it is typically released internally by the rat as part of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal
(HPA) axis’s adaptive response to stress (I. Z. Mathews, Wilton, Styles, & McCormick,
2008). CORT was dissolved in 45% hydroxypropyl-β-cyclodextrin to a dose of 5mg/mL.
The vehicle (VEH) used in the control group was 45% hydroxypropyl-β-cyclodextrin.
Corticosterone and vehicle were administered via intraperitoneal (i.p.) treatment at a
volume of 1.0 mL/kg, 15 minutes before the start of the test. This Corticosterone
administration procedure was used based on previous studies where it mimicked
physiological levels of acute stress 15 minutes following the injection (Kent, Cross-Mellor,
Kavaliers, & Ossenkopp, 2000).
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3.2.4

Cognitive Bias Apparatus

The apparatus consisted of a rectangular start box (20cm x 20cm) attached to a
rectangular arena (100cm long, 90cm wide, 25cm height) made of clear Plexiglas with a
transparent lid, set on top of a white board (fig. 3.2). A manually operated transparent
guillotine door opened into the arena from the start box. This apparatus was set up in a
designated testing room, on a table 1m above floor level. The wall colors of the open arena
were created using white or black cardboards, attached to the outside of the clear Plexiglas.
Plastic lighting sheets (2’×2’ Replacement lens for Metalux Recessed Troffer, Cooper
Lighting, GA, USA) were used to line the floor of the arena to create rough floors, and the
smooth back of the sheets were used to create smooth floors. All behaviours were
videotaped with a video camera positioned approximately 1.5 m directly above the
apparatus on the ceiling.
Five automated lickometers, each consisting of a stainless steel spout attached to a
glass graduated drinking tube, were used (Contact 108 lick analysis system, Dilog
Instruments, Tallahassee, Fl). The ends of the drinking spouts were mounted 5cm above
the arena floor. The 5 spouts were evenly spaced 15cm apart from each other, as well as
from the sides of the apparatus, on the opposite side to the start box (Fig. 3.2 and 3.3). The
two outer spouts were designated “reference locations”, and were used during the training
stage. Each spout was centered on a specific colored cue card that could be changed to give
different visual cues. The spouts were accessible through an oval opening, only big enough
for the rats’ tongues without altering the natural facial movements of drinking. To monitor
the licks, a computer-controlled lickometer (DiLog instruments, Tallahassee, FL) passed a
low, non-detectable current (~60nA) through the spouts. The electric circuit was completed
each time the rat’s tongue came into contact with the spout, and the signals were amplified
before being recorded for licking measures (QLick, version 4.0). These recordings allowed
for the analysis of the rats’ licking frequency. The volume of solutions consumed was also
quantified by manually reading the changes in fluid amounts of the graduated drinking
tubes.
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Figure 3.2. Photograph of the cognitive bias apparatus, five lickometer spouts (top)
are evenly space apart on the far wall of the apparatus, each centered on a visual cue card.

Figure 3.3. Diagram of the cognitive bias apparatus, showing the dimensions of the
start box (20cm x 20cm) and the open testing arena (100cm long, 90cm wide, 25cm
height). The light grey lines at the right side of the diagram indicate the locations of the
lickometer drinking spouts.

46

3.2.5

Training and the establishment of reference conditions

During the first 5 days of the experiment, each rat was handled daily for 10 minutes
during the light phase. 24 hours after the final handling day and for the subsequent 5 days,
all of the rats were placed into the open arena in groups of 6 for training. Group learning
facilitates the acquisition of cognitive tasks more effectively and efficiently than individual
training (Krasheninnikova & Schneider, 2014). During this time, visual (black or white
walls) and tactile (smooth or rough flooring) cues were placed in the arena to indicate the
positive or negative condition. As well, visual cue cards (black-and-white stripe or white)
were used to indicate the higher/lower reference location spouts, respectively. These two
reference locations were located at the outermost 2 locations out of the 5 possible locations;
they were 15cm from the sides of the goal box, and 60cm apart from each other.
The rats alternated between a “positive” condition and a “negative” condition for
30 minutes each, for a total of 2 hours a day in groups. The positive condition was
represented by environmental cues consisting of black walls and a rough floor. Here, a
sucrose/saccharin solution (3% sucrose with 0.125% saccharin dissolved in distilled water)
represented the higher reward-value location (associated with the black-and-white stripe
visual cue card), whereas tap water represented the lower reward value location (associated
with the white visual cue card; figure 3.4a). In contrast, the negative condition was
represented by environmental cues consisting of white walls and a smooth floor. Here, a
quinine solution (0.00005M) represented an aversive reference location (associated with
the white visual cue card), whereas tap water represented a comparably higher value
reference location (associated with a black-and-white visual cue card; Figure 3.4b). The
concentration of quinine used in this task was a very low concentration, so that rats would
find it aversive but not so much as to cause stress or major changes in appetitive behaviour.
The reward and aversive reference locations were counterbalanced between rats to
eliminate side-bias. The specific reference locations paired with a particular visual and
tactile condition environment were consistent for each rat throughout the experiment (ie.
sucrose/saccharin solution were always at the right side of the goal box).
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On the other hand, the 3 middle locations (figure 3.4) were blocked off by a smooth
board with a color that was the same as the walls, thus leaving only the 2 reference location
spouts exposed. All rats in the group had free access to explore both reference locations
(and the accompanying lickometer spouts) in the arena during this stage (figure 3.4). Since
all rats were identified by an ID marking on their tails, their exploration and consumption
of the various reference fluids were verified by video recording.
In order to determine whether the rats had acquired the task, 24 hours after the last
training day, the rats were tested individually to see if they were able to determine the more
rewarding location in the positive and negative conditions. In this stage, each rat
individually received 4 consecutive trials in a randomized order (2 trials in the positive
condition and 2 trials in the negative condition) each day for five days. Between each trial,
the apparatus was cleaned thoroughly with 20% alcohol solution. The time taken (in
seconds) for the rat to exit the start box and choose one of two reference locations was
recorded. The specific reference location spouts that the rat chose and drank from was
recorded as well. The rat was considered to have made a correct choice if it chose to drink
from the reference location spout associated with the higher reward value outcome
immediately after exiting the start box. For the positive condition, the correct choice was
the sucrose/saccharin solution, whereas in the negative condition, the correct choice was
the water. A rat was considered to be successfully trained and could advance to the next
stage if it consistently made the correct choice at least 3 times out of the 4 trials over the 5
testing days.
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a)

b)

Figure 3.4. Diagram of training apparatuses in either positive (a) or negative (b)
condition. A white intra-maze visual cue was presented in the start box. a) The rough
floor and black walls (positive) environment was associated with the higher value
sucrose/saccharin solution (3% sucrose and 0.125% saccharin dissolved in distilled
water) at the left side of the goal box (stripe cue card) and tap water on the right side
(white cue card). b) The smooth floor and white walls (negative) environment was
associated with the lower value water at the left side of the goal box (stripe cue card) and
0.00005M quinine at the right side (white cue card). The middle 3 locations (light grey
lines) were blocked off by a card with the same color as the walls.
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3.2.6

Cognitive bias test with ambiguous cues under acute stress
challenge

24 hours after the trials for establishing cognitive bias, each rat received three
consecutive days of individual cognitive bias testing with ambiguous cues. In this stage,
the trials proceeded in the same method as the previous trials, but with one additional
“ambiguous” trial included where the testing was done with an acute stress challenge using
Corticosterone. Thus, the trials were in a randomized order across animals, where each rat
received 1 trial of ambiguous cue condition plus 2 trials each of the positive and the
negative conditions. During the ambiguous condition, an insert sheet, intermediate in
texture to the two conditioned floor textures, was used as the flooring (Acrylic Lighting
Panels Cracked Ice Clear, Plaskolite Inc., Ohio, USA). In addition, grey cardboard was
attached to the walls of the apparatus to give an intermediate wall color (figure 3.5). These
two conditions created an environment where the visual and tactile cues were intermediate
to the ones used for the training trials (i.e. black walls/rough flooring for positive condition,
white walls/smooth flooring for the negative condition).
At the start of this stage, each pair of rats from the same cage were randomly
allocated to two groups, acute stress group and control. Corticosterone was used to elicit
the acute stress challenge. During the ambiguous cue test, either CORT (n=12), or VEH
(n=11) were injected intraperitoneally 15 minutes before testing each day in the ambiguous
cue context (refer to figure 3.1 for procedural outline). During these 15 minutes, the rats
were placed back into their home cages. This 15 minutes waiting period was necessary for
Corticosterone to reach peak physiological effect in the rat (Kent et al., 2000).
During the ambiguous cue trials, rats were individually tested by being exposed to
only the 3 middle “ambiguous” locations. The two reference location spouts (for the
positive and negative context conditions) were blocked off by a card in the same shade of
grey as the walls. Graduated drinking tubes containing water were placed in each of the
three middle ambiguous locations (figure 3.5). Measurements were made and recorded for
the: i) time taken for the rat to exit the start box, ii) first choice from the three lickometer
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spouts to drink from. iii) the number of licks made. If the rat selected the O1 location, it
was recorded as making a choice reflective of a positive cognitive bias; if the P3 location
was chosen, it was recorded as a choice reflective of a negative cognitive bias (figure 3.5).
30 seconds after the rat cease to drink from their initial choice spout, they were removed
from the apparatus.

Figure 3.5. Diagram of experimental apparatuses in the ambiguous task. The
smoothness/roughness of the flooring was in between the smooth and rough flooring of
the training trials. The walls were a solid grey color. The two reference locations were
blocked off and inaccessible using a smooth board with the same grey color as the walls.
The drinking tubes of the ambiguous locations (dark grey lines) contained tap water. The
O1 ambiguous location was located closest to the previously trained more rewarding
location, whereas the P3 ambiguous location was located closest to the previously trained
less rewarding/aversive location. The M ambiguous location was in the middle between
the O1 and P3 ambiguous locations.
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3.2.7

Statistical Analysis

In this experiment, all data generated were analyzed using SPSS (Version 21, SPSS
Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). The replicates in this experiment and the treatment groups were
equally counterbalanced across the conditions. The positive or negative choices across all
three testing days during the ambiguous condition testing were analyzed with the chisquare test of independence. The behavioural measures (e.g. licking patterns, latency to
approach choice spouts, and pathlengths to approach the choice spouts) during the
cognitive bias testing with ambiguous conditions were analyzed using one-way Analysis
of Variance (ANOVA). A significance level of p < 0.05 was used throughout the
experiment.
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3.3

Results

The total number of choices for the two treatment groups (VEH vs CORT) at each
of the ambiguous test locations (O1/optimistic, M/Middle, P3/Pessimistic) across the three
days of ambiguous cue testing is shown in figure 3.6. O1 represents the optimistic choice
(choosing the location closest to the rewarding reference location), P3 represents the
pessimistic choices (choosing the location closest to the aversive reference location). chisquare test for the number of choices made in the ambiguous cue test revealed significance
between the locations chosen (i.e. Optimistic choices location (O1) and Pessimistic choice
location (P3)) and treatment group (χ2(2, n=23) = 13.746, p < 0.001). Specifically, CORT
treated rats chose the pessimistic location significantly more than then VEH treated rats.
As well, VEH treated rats chose the optimistic location significantly more than the CORT
treated rats. There was no significance found between the two treatment groups for
choosing the middle location.

Figure 3.6. Comparison of choices made during the ambiguous cue testing (total)
over 3 days. There was a significant association between the locations chosen (i.e.
Optimistic choices location (O1) and Pessimistic choice location (P3)) and treatment
group. Specifically, CORT treated rats chose the pessimistic location significantly more
than then VEH treated rats, and the VEH rats chose the optimistic location significantly
more than the CORT treated rats. There was no significant difference between the two
treatment groups for the middle location. *p < 0.001
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The ambiguous choices across 3 days of ambiguous cue testing was also broken
down to be analyzed by day, shown in figure 3.7-3.9. Overall, the chi-square test revealed
that there were no statistical significances between the choices made by the two treatment
groups on days 1 and 3, but there was a significant interaction between the treatment groups
and the ambiguous location choices on day 2.
Specifically, on day 1, Chi-Square test revealed that no statistical significance
between the two treatment groups for the choice locations (χ2 (2, n=23) = 3.893, p > 0.05).
Control rats did not differ from the acute stress animals in their choices of the three
ambiguous locations. However, the VEH group exhibited a significant difference between
the O1 location to the M (χ2 (1, n=23) = 4.278, p < 0.05) and the P3 location (χ2 (1, n=23)
= 4.278, p < 0.05). The control rats chose the optimistic location significantly more than
the pessimistic location.
On day 2, Chi-Square test revealed statistical significances between the two
treatment groups for the choice locations (χ2 (2, n=23) = 7.987, p < 0.05). Specifically, the
control rats preferentially chose the optimistic location over the pessimistic location (χ2 (1,
n=23) = 11.000, p = 0.001). On the other hand, the acute stressed rats preferentially chose
the pessimistic location (χ2 (1, n=23) = 12.000, p = 0.001). No animals chose to drink from
the middle (M) location.
On day 3, chi-square test revealed no statistical significance between the two
treatment groups in terms of the location choices that the rats made (χ2 (2, n=23) = 2.500,
p > 0.05). No animals chose to drink from the middle (M) location.
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Figure 3.7. Comparison of
choices in the ambiguous
cue conditions between
the two treatment groups
on day 1. *p<0.05

Figure 3.8. Comparison of
choices in the ambiguous
cue conditions between the
two treatment groups on
day 2. No animals chose to
drink from the middle (M)
location. *p<0.05

Figure 3.9. Comparison of
choices in the ambiguous
cue conditions between the
two treatment groups on
day 3. No animals chose to
drink from the middle (M)
location.
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The mean path length taken to reach the choice spout and drink from it, as well as
the number of licks taken, and latency to approach the choice spouts for the VEH and
CORT groups are shown in Figure 3.10 – 3.12. One-way ANOVA analysis comparing
VEH and CORT treated groups revealed no significance among any of the three locations
with regards to the path length taken to reach the choice spout (F(1,55) = 0.044, p > 0.05)
and the number of licks taken at the choice spout (F(1,55) = 0.963, p > 0.05). Both the
control rats and the acute stressed rats took similar distance to reach their choice and took
similar number of licks at their choices. However, there was a significant difference
between the treatment groups in terms of latency to approach the choice spout. Specifically,
ANOVA analysis revealed that the corticosterone treated groups displayed a significant
increase in latency to make a choice in comparison to the control group ((F(1,32) = 4.114,
p <0.05). However, no significance was found when comparing the VEH and CORT
treated groups (F(1,55) = 2.875, p > 0.05) for the middle and pessimistic locations.

Figure 3.10. Path lengths taken to reach choice spout and drink from it during
ambiguous cue testing trials. There were no significances between any of the three
locations when comparing between VEH vs. CORT rats’ performances (p > 0.05). No
standard errors were generated (n=1) for the results from CORT rats at the M location.
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Figure 3.11. Number of licks taken at the choice spout during the ambiguous cue
testing trials. There was no significance found between the VEH and CORT groups for
the licking frequency (p > 0.05). No standard errors were generated (n=1) for the results
from CORT rats at the M location.

Figure 3.12. Latency to approach the choice spout in the ambiguous cue testing
trials. No significance was found when comparing between the VEH and CORT treated
groups (p > 0.05) for the middle and negative cognitive bias locations, but there was a
significant difference between the CORT and the VEH groups when the rats approached
the positive cognitive bias (O1) location, with the CORT treated rats taking significantly
longer time to approach the location (F(1,32) = 4.114, p <0.05). No standard errors were
generated (n=1) for the results from CORT rats at the M location.
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3.4

Discussion

The current study was able to build upon the previously established cognitive bias
task by first demonstrating a positive cognitive bias at the basal level in rats, even with
possible mild stress from injection. More importantly, this experiment demonstrated a shift
to negative cognitive bias from the baseline positive cognitive bias following acute stress
challenge using corticosterone.
Specifically, the baseline optimism that was observed in experiment 1 was shifted
towards pessimism when rats were subjected to acute stress challenge from corticosterone
treatment. Such pessimism is an indication of a shift towards negative cognitive bias, which
is a key component of neuropsychiatric affective disorders such as depression. In this
experiment, control rats that received the vehicle injection displayed an overall optimism
in the ambiguous condition, similar to the findings from chapter 2, where rats demonstrated
positive cognitive bias without any stress manipulations (i.e. injections). This showed that
the injection procedure itself was not enough of a stressor to cause shifts in cognitive bias.
As well, rats preferentially avoided the middle location across 3 days. In contrast, rats
treated with Corticosterone displayed significant shift in cognitive bias to negative when
presented with ambiguous stimuli. These rats preferentially chose to drink from the
ambiguous choice location associated with the less-rewarding/aversive reference location
(P3 location). Thus, the current study is consistent with previous research on chronic mild
stress, and showed that negative emotional states will shift baseline optimism towards
“pessimism” (negative cognitive bias) under ambiguous conditions.
However, the CORT treated rats exhibited a shift in their preferences across 3 days.
This is shown by the comparison of the results from day 3 to those from days 1 and 2.
Specifically, there was no significant interactions between the CORT treatment with the
location choices on days 1 and 3. In contrast, the same CORT treated group demonstrated
strong preference for the pessimistic (P3) location on day 2. This effect may be due to the
acclimation of animals to the ambiguous condition through 3 days of testing. The animals
were allowed a small window of time (30seconds) after making a choice to remain in the
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open arena. This was done to reduce the possibility of conditioned pairing between specific
spouts and handling stress. However, this did allow some of the rats to have extra time to
further explore the other choices. Since the ambiguous locations were all reinforced with
water, the rats that did go on to explore the other ambiguous choices would have found that
all spouts gave equal outcomes, which may potentially have interfered with their responses
in the succeeding trials.
Overall, the rats were generally not affected by locomotor confounders, as indicated
by the lack of differences in latency, licking, and path length measures between the VEH
and CORT groups. There was one exception, where acute-stressed rats took longer time
(not path) to approach the O1 location (indicative of positive cognitive bias). This suggests
that the acute stress rats showed a lack of an expectation of a positive outcome at that
specific ambiguous condition. This increase in latency, when paired with the results
showing significant difference in optimism and pessimism, suggested altered response to
the reward value of the outcome. The rats showed an increased expectation of a negative
outcome (indicative of anxiety), or a decreased expectation of a positive outcome
(indicative of depression). While it may be difficult to understand why these animals are
preferentially choosing the less rewarding outcome, it is important to note that these
behaviors (anhedonia and behavioral despair) are indicators of a negative affective state
for both humans and animal models. Specifically, anhedonia (i.e. reduced preference for
sweet sucrose solution because of a decrease in its rewarding value) and behavioral despair
have been well established in the human population as key characteristics of mood
disorders (JP et al., 1972). As well. they are also well established in rodent models of
depression (Harkin, Houlihan, & Kelly, 2002; Rygula et al., 2005; Willner, 1997). Such
maladaptive, or “irrational”, behavior responses do reflect results from animal welfare
research with chronic mild stress. The lack of environmental enrichment can elicit robust
maladaptive behaviors, abnormal brain development, and impaired higher-order cognitive
functioning (Simpson & Kelly, 2011; Würbel, 2001). In addition, acute administrations of
corticosterone in rats have been shown to decrease fear in threatening situations, a
maladaptive behavior (Skórzewska et al., 2007).
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The present cognitive bias task also presents important advantages over previously
established chronic stress paradigms. First, since acute corticosterone was administered
only before undergoing ambiguous cue test (not throughout the whole experiment),
differences in the task acquisition versus testing stages can be teased out. This differs from
a number of animal welfare research, where chronic stress treatment was applied before
the onset of training and testing, making it difficult to examine only the effect of ambiguous
cues on affective cognition (Marks, Fournier, & Kalynchuk, 2009; Olausson, Kiraly,
Gourley, & Taylor, 2013; Skórzewska et al., 2006). Another advantage of the current acute
stress task is the potential to use it to study the effect of different levels of stress. Although
only a physiological level of acute stress was used in this study, a number of variations
could be used to examine the effect of low to high stress on cognitive bias by varying the
concentration of corticosterone.
On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind that the ambiguous cues used in
the current task were composed of two components. The environmental visual/tactile cues
(grey walls and intermediate grain flooring) and the choice location cues (grey cue cards
indicating the middle choice locations) were combined in this task to evaluate shifts in
cognitive bias. However, whether each ambiguous component (i.e. ambiguous
environment versus ambiguous choices) have a separate effect on cognitive bias is unclear.
This is important to examine, and is the focus of the next chapter, in order to further tease
out the mechanisms underlying cognitive bias.
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EFFECTS OF AMBIGUOUS ENVIRONMENTAL AND
CHOICE CUES ON COGNITVE BIAS

4

4.1

Introduction

In humans, cognitive bias has been well established as the result of an interplay
between cognition and affect. The way information with ambiguous or unclear meanings
is cognitively processed tends to be biased by the positive or negative mood (or “affective
valence”) of the subject. As a result, decisional and behavioral outcomes are altered to
reflect the propensity of the subject towards a specific affective valence. Specifically, a
negative cognitive bias, characterized by indicators such as an increased anticipation of
negative events or decreased anticipation of positive events, plays a key role in affective
disorders such as depression and anxiety (e.g. Beck et al., 1979; A. Mathews & MacLeod,
2005; a Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Mineka Sutton,Steven K., 1992; Rude, Valdez,
Odom, & Ebrahimi, 2003).
When translated to animal models, such traits have also been found. Although tests
of cognitive bias cannot unequivocally show whether animals consciously experience
subjective affect changes, these do provide objective indicators for animals’ affective
valences. This is commonly seen as an anticipation of either positive or negative outcomes
in response to affectively ambiguous situations. The development of an objective cognitive
bias model using non-human animals have generally adopted a similar framework. The
animal is first trained to distinguish between a positive condition and a negative condition
based on distinct contextual stimuli and outcome reinforcement (e.g. high-value reward or
aversive outcome). Then, the animal is subjected to some affective manipulations designed
to generate positive or negative affective states, followed by exposures to a new condition
where the stimuli are ambiguous (i.e. intermediate to the trained conditions). The responses
of the animals in this ambiguous condition would then be scored to show any shifts in
cognitive bias by an increased anticipation for the positive or negative outcomes. A
negative (or “pessimistic”) response would be accompanied by an increased likelihood of
responding to the ambiguous cues with a prediction of a negative outcome, and a positive
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(or “optimistic”) response would be opposite. In studies of negative cognitive bias, chronic
mild stress has been extensively shown to cause an increased expectation of the negative
event and/or decreased expectation of the positive event in a wide range of non-human
animals such as dogs, bees, starlings, and rodents (Bateson et al., 2011; Burman et al.,
2009; Matheson et al., 2008; Michael Mendl et al., 2010, 2009).
The development of an objective rodent model of cognitive bias is still in its
infancy. Since the pioneering study by Harding et al (2004), various models have been
developed in an attempt to improve upon the test specificity to better elucidate a clearer
understanding of the mechanisms underlying cognitive bias. One major discovery based
on the original Harding et al study revealed the advantages of using a go-go task format
over a go/no-go format. By requiring active responses to the condition stimuli, the analysis
of the animals’ responses in the ambiguous condition can eliminate confounders such as
stimulus-related motivation and behavior changes, as well as give clearer indications of
active responses versus active omission (Brydges et al., 2011; Harding et al., 2004). In
addition, proceeding studies revealed disadvantages of using a testing apparatus with
unclear distribution of condition stimuli. For example, a study by Burman et al (2009) using
an adapted radial arm maze revealed that the specific locations of the arms prompted the
rats to view all ambiguous choices together as a general “ambiguous outcome” rather than
specific “ambiguous locations” with distinct values (Burman et al., 2009).
In the preceding studies, a cognitive bias model that could be used to evaluate the
changes in affective state, such as that elicited by corticosterone inducted acute stress, was
developed. It was shown that male rats under acute stress displayed a negative cognitive
bias when facing completely ambiguous (novel) condition cues. This was characterized by
stressed rats making a slower response to the ambiguous condition and making more
negative choices, indicating a reduced anticipation of reward (anhedonia). However, in
order to further our understanding of this shift in cognitive bias in response to ambiguous
cues, there is a need to refine the distinction between the ambiguous environmental/choice
location cues. In particular, the ambiguous condition had 2 separate components. The first
component was the background environmental cue, which consisted of intermediate grain
flooring and grey walls (intermediate to the black wall of positive training condition, and
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the white wall of the negative training condition). The second component was the
ambiguous visual cues associated with the actual choice locations (hereafter referred to as
“ambiguous choice location cues”). Thus far, in the present cognitive bias task developed
in experiments 1 and 2, these two components of the ambiguous condition have been
grouped together during the evaluation of cognitive bias.
Specifically, during the cognitive bias testing with ambiguous cues, the previously
trained reference locations were blocked off, leaving only the three middle “novel”
locations available to choose from. Each of these locations were centered on a grey visual
cue card (ambiguous choice location cue), within an environment that was also
intermediate to the previously trained backgrounds (grey walls and intermediate flooring).
It was shown that when both environmental and choice location components were
ambiguous, rats exhibited very distinct cognitive biases. The control rats displayed a
positive (optimistic) cognitive bias, and acute stress treated rats displayed a negative
(pessimistic) cognitive bias. However, whether these two components (environment vs
choice location cues) interact with each other or act independently to influence affective
states are still unknown. For example, if an ambiguous choice is offered in a positive
environment, would the resultant behavior become more positive? Therefore, in order to
further elucidate the mechanisms underlying cognitive bias, it is necessary to examine each
separate component to see whether they have distinct effects on cognitive bias shifts.
In experiment 3, the mechanisms underlying shifts in cognitive bias as result of
affective state changes were further examined. Specifically, the present study examined
whether or not ambiguous environmental and ambiguous choice location cues interact with
each other to influence behavioral outcomes of cognitive bias. This was achieved by
creating two new conditions in the testing stage, where the presence of positive or negative
environmental factors were coupled with ambiguous choice location cues (grey visual cue
card at the choice spouts). The first condition, where positive environmental cues (black
walls/rough flooring) were coupled with ambiguous choice location cues (grey visual cue
card), will be referred to as the “positive ambiguous condition”. The second condition,
where the negative environmental cues (white walls/smooth flooring) were coupled with
the same ambiguous choice location cues, will be referred to as the “negative ambiguous
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condition”. The purpose of using these two new conditions was to separate the two
components of the ambiguous condition and evaluate whether or not they have different
effects on cognitive bias. In order to properly evaluate this, responses were compared to
the previously established, “original” ambiguous condition where the two ambiguous
components were added together (grey walls, intermediate grain flooring, and grey
ambiguous location visual cue cards). Thus, rats were also tested under the original
ambiguous conditions without any stress manipulations (same as experiment 1), and with
acute stress challenge using corticosterone (same as experiment 2).
It was hypothesized that the two components of the ambiguous condition work
independently to generate cognitive bias. Specifically, environmental cues would have an
effect on the choices made at the three ambiguous choice locations. After the establishment
of the positive and the negative conditions during training, the associated environmental
cues (wall colors and floor texture) would affect rats’ choices in response to the three
middle novel “ambiguous” locations. Specifically, in the positive ambiguous condition
(positive environmental cues with ambiguous choice location visual cue), rats would
display a preference for the more positive location (O1), similar to that of the original
ambiguous condition. Similarly, rats would respond in the same manner in the negative
ambiguous condition (negative environmental cues with ambiguous choice location visual
cue) as the previously trained negative conditions.
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4.2
4.2.1

Materials and Methods
Experimental procedure

Handling
and
Training
Handle: 10min/day,
5days
Training (5 days)
(In randomized and
counterbalanced
groups):
30 min alternations (2
hrs total) between:
Negative conditions
 white walls, smooth
flooring
 stripe cue card: higher
reward reference
location (water)
 white cue card:
aversive reference
location (0.00005M
Quinine solution)

Positive Conditions
 black walls, rough
flooring
 Stripe cue card: higher
reward reference
location
(sucrose/saccharin
solution)
 white cue card: lower
reward value reference
location (water)

Establish
Reference
Conditions
Time: 5 days
Tested
Individually
4 randomized
trials (2 reward
and 2 aversive
conditions)
Recorded:
 Latency to
make a choice
 Pathlengths
travelled to
the choice
location
 Choices made

Move on to
testing stage if
successful on 3
out of 4 trials

Training for Cognitive Bias
Figure 4.1. Outline of procedures for experiment 3.

Cognitive Bias
Test with
Ambiguous Cue
Time: 5 days
 Day 1: Positive
Ambiguous Condition
(Positive
environmental cues
with middle
ambiguous choices)
 Day 2: Negative
Ambiguous Condition
(Negative
environmental cues
with middle
ambiguous choices)
 Day 3: Original
ambiguous condition
(ambiguous
environmental cues
and choice locations)
 Day 4&5: Same as
day 3, but with i.p.
injection of either
CORT (5mg/kg) or
VEH (1ml/kg) given 15
min before testing
 Positive affective
state (“Optimistic”) if
chose O1 location
closest to trained
positive location
 Negative affective
state (“pessimistic”) if
chose P3 location
closest to trained
negative location

68

4.2.2

Animals
Twelve adult male Long-Evans rats (Charles River, Quebec, Canada), weighing

between 300 - 450g at the start of the experiment were used. The rats were pair housed in
standard polypropylene cages (45cm × 22cm × 20cm), in a colony room with ad libitum
access to both food (ProLab RMH3000 rat chow) and tap water when applicable. The
colony room was maintained at 21± 2°C, on a 12:12 hour light/dark cycle with the lights
on from 07:00 to 19:00 h. All experiments were carried out during the light phase. For the
entire duration of the experiment, each rat was water deprived for 15 hours starting at the
beginning of their dark cycle (starting at 19:00h), and then given one-and-a-half-minute
access to tap water at the end of the water deprivation period. This method was used so that
rats would be motivated to explore and drink from the liquid reinforcements that were used
to indicate differences between positive and negative conditions. The rats were observed
during the one-and-a-half-minute water access to ensure that each rat drank from the water
bottle. Each rat was given identification markings on their tails using a permanent marker
(Black Sharpie pen). All procedures were performed according to the Canadian Council on
Animal Care guidelines and were approved by the Western University Animal Care
Committee.

4.2.3

Drugs
Corticosterone (Cort; Sigma, Toronto, ON) was used to mimic the effect of acute

stress challenge on days 4 and 5. CORT was dissolved in 45% hydroxypropyl-βcyclodextrin to a dose of 5mg/mL. The vehicle (VEH) used in the control group was 45%
hydroxypropyl-β-cyclodextrin. Corticosterone and vehicle were administered via
intraperitoneal (i.p.) treatment at a volume of 1.0 mL/kg, 15 minutes before the start of the
test. This Corticosterone administration procedure was used based on previous studies
where it mimicked physiological levels of acute stress 15 minutes following the injection
(Kent et al., 2000).
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4.2.4

Training and the establishment of reference conditions

During the first 5 days of the experiment, each rat was handled daily for 10 minutes
during the light phase. 24 hours after the final handling day and for the subsequent 5 days,
all of the rats were placed into the open arena in groups of 6 for training. Group learning
facilitates the acquisition of cognitive tasks more effectively and efficiently than individual
training (Krasheninnikova & Schneider, 2014). During this time, visual (black or white
walls) and tactile (smooth or rough flooring) cues were placed in the arena to indicate the
positive or negative condition. As well, visual cue cards (black-and-white stripe or white)
were used to indicate the higher/lower reference location spouts, respectively. These two
reference locations were located at the outermost 2 locations out of the 5 possible locations;
they were 15cm from the sides of the goal box, and 60cm apart from each other.
The rats alternated between a “positive” condition and a “negative” condition for
30 minutes each, for a total of 2 hours a day in groups. The positive condition was
represented by environmental cues consisting of black walls and a rough floor. Here, a
sucrose/saccharin solution (3% sucrose with 0.125% saccharin dissolved in distilled water)
represented the higher reward-value location (associated with the black-and-white stripe
visual cue card), whereas tap water represented the lower reward value location (associated
with the white visual cue card; figure 4.2a). In contrast, the negative condition was
represented by environmental cues consisting of white walls and a smooth floor. Here, a
quinine solution (0.00005M) represented an aversive reference location (associated with
the white visual cue card), whereas tap water represented a comparably higher value
reference location (associated with a black-and-white visual cue card; Figure 4.2b). The
concentration of quinine used in this task was a very low concentration, so that rats would
find it aversive but not so much as to cause stress or major changes in appetitive behaviour.
The reward and aversive reference locations were counterbalanced between rats to
eliminate side-bias. The specific reference locations paired with a particular visual and
tactile condition environment were consistent for each rat throughout the experiment (ie.
sucrose/saccharin solution were always at the right side of the goal box).
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On the other hand, the 3 middle locations (figure 4.2) were blocked off by a smooth
board with a color that was the same as the walls, thus leaving only the 2 reference location
spouts exposed. All rats in the group had free access to explore both reference locations
(and the accompanying lickometer spouts) in the arena during this stage (figure 4.2). Since
all rats were identified by an ID marking on their tails, their exploration and consumption
of the various reference fluids were verified by video recording.
In order to determine whether the rats had acquired the task, the rats were tested
individually 24 hours after the last training day to see if they were able to determine the
more rewarding location in the positive and negative conditions. In this stage, each rat
individually received 4 consecutive trials in a randomized order (2 trials in the positive
condition and 2 trials in the negative condition) each day for five days. Between each trial,
the apparatus was cleaned thoroughly with 20% alcohol solution. The time taken (in
seconds) for the rat to exit the start box and choose one of two reference locations was
recorded. The specific reference location spouts that the rat chose and drank from was
recorded as well. The rat was considered to have made a correct choice if it chose to drink
from the reference location spout associated with the higher reward value outcome
immediately after exiting the start box. For the positive condition, the correct choice was
the sucrose/saccharin solution, whereas in the negative condition, the correct choice was
the water. A rat was considered to be successfully trained and could advance to the next
stage if it consistently made the correct choice at least 3 times out of the 4 trials over the 5
testing days.
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a)

b)

Figure 4.2. Diagram of training apparatuses in either positive (a) or negative (b)
condition. A white intra-maze visual cue was presented in the start box. a) The rough
floor and black walls (positive) environment was associated with the higher value
sucrose/saccharin solution (3% sucrose and 0.125% saccharin dissolved in distilled
water) at the left side of the goal box (stripe cue card) and tap water on the right side
(white cue card). b) The smooth floor and white walls (negative) environment was
associated with the lower value water at the left side of the goal box (stripe cue card) and
0.00005M quinine at the right side (white cue card). The middle 3 locations (light grey
lines) were blocked off by a card with the same color as the walls.
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4.2.5

Cognitive bias testing with ambiguous cues and previously trained
environmental conditions

24 hours following the last stage, rats moved onto the cognitive bias testing with
ambiguous cue condition, which lasted for five days. During this stage, the previously
trained reference locations were now blocked off, leaving only the three middle
“ambiguous” locations exposed (Figure 4.3 – 4.4). The lickometer drinking tubes contained
water, and were placed in each of the three middle ambiguous locations. Ambiguous
position 1 (O1) was located 15cm to the right of the reward location, and indicated a
positive cognitive bias (optimistic choice) due to its close proximity to the previously
trained positive reference location. The ambiguous position 3 (P3) was located 15cm to the
left of the aversive location, and indicated a negative cognitive bias (pessimistic choice)
due to its close proximity to the previously trained negative reference location. Ambiguous
location 2 (M) was in the middle, 30cm to either of the two reference locations. The time
was recorded for when the rat exited the start box and drank from one of the three
lickometer spouts; the choice the rats made, as well as the number of licks taken were also
recorded. If the rat selected the O1 location, it was recorded as making an optimistic choice;
if the P3 location was chosen, it was recorded as a pessimistic choice. This was true for all
five days of testing with ambiguous cues.
Day 1 and 2
On the first day of this testing stage, each rat was allowed access to only the 3
middle ambiguous locations, paired with a grey cue card at the lickometer spouts, in two
separate trials each day for three days. The arena presented a positive condition (black
walls and rough floor), with the two reference locations blocked off using black cardboard
(Figure 4.3a). The ambiguous lickometer drinking spouts contained water as the outcome.
This was referred to as the “positive ambiguous condition”. The second day followed the
same procedure as the day one, except the arena was changed to show the negative
condition (white walls and smooth floor), and the two reference locations blocked off using
white cardboard (Figure 4.3b). This was referred to as the “negative ambiguous condition”.
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Figure 4.3. Diagram of the environmental conditions given on days 1 and 2. A)
Positive Ambiguous Condition was used on day 1, where positive environmental cues
were paired with ambiguous choice location cues (indicated by grey visual cue cards). B)
Negative Ambiguous Condition was used on day 2, where negative environmental cues
were also paired with the same ambiguous choice location cues. The reference locations
from the training stage were now blocked off, but are shown in grey to indicate their
locations for reference. The O1 ambiguous location was located closest to the previously
trained more rewarding location, whereas the P3 ambiguous location was located closest
to the previously trained less rewarding/aversive location. The M ambiguous location was
in the middle between the O1 and P3 ambiguous locations.
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Day 3
On day three, the arena showed a completely ambiguous condition, same as that
used in chapters 1 and 2. Here, an “ambiguous” insert sheet, intermediate in texture to the
two conditioned floor textures, was used as the flooring (Acrylic Lighting Panels Cracked
Ice Clear, Plaskolite Inc., Ohio, USA). In addition, grey cardboard was used for the walls
to give an intermediate wall color (Figure 4.4). Here, the rats were exposed to only the 3
middle “ambiguous” locations with the two reference locations blocked off by a smooth
card (same shade of grey as the walls).
Day 4 and 5
In order to examine whether rats displayed shifts in cognitive bias during the
positive and negative ambiguous conditions (days 1 and 2), they were then subjected to
previously established ambiguous environmental/choice location cues with corticosteroneinduced acute stress (figure 4.4). Here, on days four and five, the procedure (including the
ambiguous condition) followed that of day three, except the rats were randomly divided
into vehicle and CORT groups prior to receiving their respective injections 15 minutes
before each rat underwent testing.

Figure 4.4. Diagram of experimental apparatuses in the ambiguous task for day 3.
The drinking tubes of the ambiguous locations (dark grey lines) contained tap water.
Choosing to drink from the O1 location indicated optimism while drinking from the P3
location indicated pessimism.
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4.2.6

Statistical Analysis

All data generated in this experiment were analyzed using SPSS (Version 21, SPSS
Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). The replicates in this experiment and the treatment groups were
equally counterbalanced across the conditions. For the training stage, the data for correctly
and incorrectly choosing the higher reward value outcome for each condition were
compared separately using the chi-square test, as this was needed to determine when the
rats were ready to proceed to the next stage. The behavioural measures during the cognitive
bias testing with ambiguous cue conditions (Licking pattern and latency to approach choice
spouts) were analyzed using one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). The specific
choices that the animals made, the O1 (positive cognitive bias), P3 (negative cognitive
bias), or the middle location was analyzed using chi-square test of independence to find
whether the choices made at the three ambiguous locations were significantly different
between the two treatment groups. A significance level of p < 0.05 was used throughout
the experiment.
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4.3

4.3.1

Results

Training and the establishment of Cognitive Bias
All rats were observed through live video-recording to have explored and drunk

from each of the reference locations. Then, during the establishment of cognitive bias
phase, each rat’s performance was evaluated on whether they had successfully acquired the
task in the positive and the negative training conditions. Correct choice on the positive and
negative conditions required the rats to choose the more rewarding locations three out of
four times (i.e. sucrose/saccharin for the positive condition, water for the negative
condition). Chi-Square analysis did not reveal a significant difference between the choice
(always choosing the higher reward value outcome) and the condition (positive or negative
condition) (χ2 (1, n=12) = 1.778, p > 0.05). Where rats always chose the higher reward
value outcome regardless of whether the condition was positive or negative. As well, ChiSquare test revealed a significance between the correct choices (drinking from the more
reward location) and incorrect choices (drinking from the less rewarding/aversive
location), where rats made the correct choices significantly more (figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5. Comparison of correct and incorrect choices (accumulation of all trials for
all rats) made during the establishment of cognitive bias trials. There were no
interaction between accuracy of choice and the condition presented (p > 0.05), but rats
made significantly more correct choices (more rewarding location). *p<0.05
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4.3.2

Cognitive bias testing with Ambiguous Cue

Choices made in the positive and the negative ambiguous conditions
Chi-Square analysis revealed no significance between the “optimistic” location
(O1) and the “pessimistic” location (P3) in the positive ambiguous condition (day 1), the
negative ambiguous condition (day 2), and with stress treatment (VEH and CORT) in the
original ambiguous treatment (both ambiguous environmental cues and choice location
cues) (χ2 (4, n=12) = 3.145, p > 0.05; figure 4.6). Rats did not differ in their positive and
negative choices of the three ambiguous locations when the environmental cues were the
same as the previously trained positive and negative conditions. As well, following
treatments with acute stress challenge, rats also did not preferentially choose positively or
negatively when facing both the ambiguous environmental and choice location cues.
However, rats’ performances in the original ambiguous condition (both ambiguous
environmental and choice location cues) without injection treatments showed a significant
difference in the number of optimistic choices made (figure 4.6). Rats who did not receive
any injections preferentially chose to drink from the O1 location (χ2 (1, n=12) = 6.494, p <
0.05).
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Figure 4.6. A) Choices made by rats in the positive ambiguous condition (day 1),
negative ambiguous condition (day 2), and original ambiguous conditions (no
injections). No significant differences were found between choices made in the positive
and negative ambiguous conditions (p > 0.05). Only the original ambiguous without any
treatment injections showed a significant difference in the positive and negative choices,
with a strong preference for the positive (O1) location (p < 0.05). B) Choices made with
VEH and CORT treatments for comparison.

79

Latency, licking, and path length measures
First, the latency for the animals to make a choice only in the original ambiguous
conditions (grey walls and intermediate flooring), with and without stress treatment during
days 1-3, was analyzed and compared. ANOVA analysis revealed no significant
differences between the latencies of rats treated with a vehicle injection and rats that did
not receive any injection treatments (p > 0.05; figure 4.7). The injection itself did not cause
significant psychological changes to shift rats’ positive or negative choices in the
completely ambiguous condition. As well, no significance was found between the latencies
of vehicle rats versus acute stressed rats in making a choice (p > 0.05; figure 4.7).
However, there was a significant difference between the latency to make a choice between
the rats that did not receive any injection treatments versus receiving corticosterone
treatment (F(4, 57) = 3.764, p < 0.05). Rats that did not receive any treatments took
significantly longer time to make a choice when compared with rats that were under acute
stress.

Figure 4.7. The latency for the animals to make a choice in the original ambiguous
condition (grey walls, intermediate floor, grey visual cue indicating the choice spouts
in the middle, see figure 25), with and without any acute stress treatment. One-way
ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the latency to approach the choice
between the acute-stress treated rats and rats that did not receive any injection treatments.
There was no significant difference between rats’ latency to approach choice between the
vehicle control rats and rats that did not receive any injection treatments.

80

These results were then compared to the latencies of rats making a choice in the
positive and negative ambiguous conditions on days 1 and 2 (refer to figure 4.3). The mean
latency from the time that the rat exited the start box to the time it made a choice during
the ambiguous cue test was compared between the positive ambiguous condition (positive
environmental cues with ambiguous choice location cues), negative ambiguous condition
(negative environmental cues with ambiguous choice location cues), original ambiguous
conditions without injections (refer to figure 4.4). It was found that overall, there was a
significant interaction between conditions and the latency for the rats to make a choice
(Figure 4.8). Specifically, rats took a significantly shorter amount of time to make a choice
in the positive ambiguous condition (black walls and rough flooring), than the negative
ambiguous conditions (white walls and smooth flooring) (F(1,22) = 17.117, p < 0.001).
When the choices in the positive ambiguous condition was compared to the original
ambiguous condition without any treatment (ambiguous environmental and choice location
cues), it was found that rats took significantly less time to make a choice in the positive
ambiguous condition (F(1,22) = 5.860, p < 0.05). However, when comparing the negative
ambiguous conditions with the original ambiguous conditions, ANOVA analysis revealed
no significant differences in the latency to make a choice (F(1,22) = 0.634, p > 0.05).
ANOVA analysis did not reveal a significant interaction between the condition and
the latency measures in the original ambiguous condition when rats were subjected to acute
stress challenge (VEH or CORT) (F(4,57) = 3.764, p > 0.05) (figure 4.8).
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Figure 4.8. The latency for the animals to make a choice in the positive
environmental condition with ambiguous choices, the negative environmental
condition with ambiguous choices, and the original completely ambiguous condition.
Rats took longer to make a choice in the positive ambiguous condition when compared to
the negative ambiguous condition (F(1,22) = 17.117, p = 0.000), and the original
condition with no stress manipulations (F(1,22) = 5.860, p < 0.05). As well, acute
stressed rats took significantly shorter time to make a choice in the original ambiguous
condition than rats without any stress manipulations in the same condition (F(4, 57) =
3.764, p < 0.05). No differences in latency to make a choice was found between all other
conditions.
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When the number of licks that the rats took in each of the testing conditions were
compared, ANOVA analysis revealed a significant difference among the rats when they
were in the positive and negative environmental conditions with ambiguous choice cues
(Refer to figure 4.3; F(4,57) = 3.450, p < 0.05). Rats took significantly more licks in the
negative ambiguous condition when compared to the positive ambiguous condition (figure
4.9). As well, we compared the rats’ performance in the original ambiguous conditions (see
figure 4.4) with the positive/negative environmental conditions with ambiguous choice
cues (see figure 4.3). There was a significant difference between the number of licks taken
while in the positive environmental conditions when compared with acute-stressed rats in
the original ambiguous condition, where stressed rats took significantly more licks at their
choices (F(4,57) = 3.450, p < 0.05). Similarly, the licking patterns in the positive
environmental conditions were not significantly different from the rats with no treatment
injection in the original ambiguous condition (F(4,57) = 3.450, p > 0.05) (Figure 4.9).

Figure 4.9. The number of licks that the animals took at the ambiguous cue tests.
Rats took more licks in the negative environmental conditions with ambiguous choice
cues rather than the positive environmental condition (F(4,57) = 3.450, p < 0.05). Rats
also drank more when they were in the original ambiguous condition than when they
were in the positive ambiguous condition. In contrast, the licking frequency of the rats
was significantly lower in the positive ambiguous condition than the acute stressed rats
(F(4,57) = 3.450, p < 0.05), but did not differ from the licking frequency of the un-treated
or vehicle rats (p > 0.05).
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4.4

Discussion

The aim of the present experiment was to determine whether the two ambiguous
components, environmental (visual and tactile cues) and choice location cues, interact with
each other to influence cognitive bias. Contrary to the hypothesis, the two components of
the ambiguous condition (environmental cues versus choice location cues) did not work
independently to produce changes in cognitive bias. That is, rats did not preferentially
choose an ambiguous location depending on the environmental condition (positive
condition or negative condition, respectively). In fact, rats demonstrated no differences in
their choices of three ambiguous locations when the environmental cues were that of
previously trained positive or negative visual/tactile cues. In other words, when the two
components of the ambiguous condition were separated, there were no differences in
optimistic vs pessimistic responses to the ambiguous location choices. In addition, the
licking and latency measures both indicated an increased expectation of a lower reward
value outcome for the positive and the negative ambiguous conditions. Rats preferentially
took longer to approach and drank from the choice spouts in the negative ambiguous
condition in comparison to the positive.
Specifically, when the positive ambiguous condition was presented (black
walls/rough flooring with grey choice location cue at the middle 3 locations), the rats did
not differ in their choices between the O1 location and the P3 location. The same trend was
observed in the negative ambiguous condition (white walls/smooth flooring with only the
3 middle ambiguous choices to drink from). However, when the condition completely
changed to one that was ambiguous (grey walls/intermediate grain flooring with 3 middle
ambiguous choices) on day 3, the rats preferentially chose to drink from the O1 location,
indicative of positive cognitive bias. With the same ambiguous conditions but under a
treatment of either the VEH injection or the CORT acute stress challenge, their responses
changed again. While the acute stressed rats did show a decrease in the number of
optimistic choices made, the pessimistic choices did not differ from that of the VEH rats.
The only similarity was that the control rats did not preferentially choose the middle
location, which was also the same trend seen while in the positive ambiguous condition
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and the original ambiguous condition without treatment injection. Both the negative
ambiguous condition and the acute stressed rats demonstrated no significant preference
between any of the three ambiguous locations (i.e. no negative cognitive bias was
observed). These results differed from that of experiment 2, where it was found that CORT
treatment induced a preferential choice at the pessimistic location (P3), indicative of a
negative cognitive bias.
Such differences are unlikely to be due to chance or individual differences, as we
do see a very clear positive cognitive bias as soon as the condition changed from partially
ambiguous to completely ambiguous. This potentially indicates that both components of
the ambiguous condition, environmental and choice location cues, must be “ambiguous”
at the same time in order to accurately test cognitive bias. The lack of difference in positive
and negative choices in the positive and negative ambiguous conditions could have been
due to the novelty of the condition itself. The environmental visual and tactile cues were
very salient to rats, and rats may therefore have been habituated to the environment enough
to see it as a new “novel” condition to explore.

Another interesting result to note is

the subtle shift of cognitive bias from no treatment injection to the VEH treatment. There
was a slight shift towards less positive choices and more negative choices. Although the
differences were not statistically significant, this shift is still worth noting, as it may
indicate the potential adverse effect of the act of injection on stress levels in the rat.
When the choices of the acute stressed rats were compared to that of the vehicle
rats on days 4 and 5, the results showed a difference from that of chapter 2. In the previous
study, acute corticosterone challenge elicited a negative response to the ambiguous stimuli
in comparison to the control rats. In the present study, this interaction was not seen.
Following exposures to a variety of ambiguous stimuli combinations, the administration of
acute stress did not alter rat’s responses towards a negative cognitive bias. A possible
explanation may be that the sequence of the ambiguous stimuli presented somehow
changed the value and the ambiguity of the novel environmental to the rats. The rats were
repeatedly exposed to the various ambiguous components before the onset of acute stress,
first only the choice locations in days 1 and 2, then both environmental and choice location
cues on day 3. This was different from the previous study, where the onset of acute stress
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challenge was accompanied by the first exposures to the ambiguous condition. Here, as the
primary objective was to elucidate any changes in rats’ responses to only one component
of the ambiguous condition, it was appropriate to expose them to the positive and negative
ambiguous conditions first. As such, it is unclear whether rats’ responses would change to
reflect the pattern observed in the preceding study if the order of the ambiguous conditions
presentation was altered.
The current experiment confirmed the importance of ambiguous cues by showing
the necessity of combining both ambiguous environmental cues and choice location cues
in the evaluation of cognitive bias. Previous studies that have established various rodent
models of cognitive bias used both components to create the ambiguous condition. For
example, Brydges et al (2011) used different coarseness of sandpaper and olfactory cues
(cinnamon versus coriander) in conjunction with chocolate or cheerio reinforcements to
create the different testing/training conditions. Thus, it was of interest to examine how
different components of the ambiguous stimuli affect cognitive bias responses. In all, the
current task demonstrated great potentials in evaluating and elucidating the mechanisms
underlying cognitive bias in rats.
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5

GENERAL DISCUSSIONS

The aim of this thesis was to first develop a reliable model of cognitive bias. A task
using a non-operant approach was successfully developed to model cognitive bias in rats,
using visual and tactile cues in conjunction with higher/lower reward enforcements. This
was developed so that changes in cognitive bias, such as that from an acute stress challenge,
can be examined using this task. In experiment 1, an appetitive task was created using
highly salient visual/tactile cues to evaluate cognitive bias. It was found that under normal,
unaltered conditions, healthy male rats displayed a positive cognitive bias (“optimism”) in
response to ambiguous conditions. Then, in experiment 2, the same task was used to
evaluate the effect of acute stress challenge on cognitive bias. It was found that the baseline
optimism was shifted towards pessimism (negative cognitive bias) in response to the
ambiguous condition when a (physiologically relevant level of) corticosterone was
administered. Lastly, in experiment 3, the ambiguous condition was dissected to further
examine the mechanisms underlying cognitive bias. When the two components of the
ambiguous condition (environmental visual/tactile cues and the choice location visual
cues) were separated, there were no differences in optimistic and pessimistic responses.
This indicated that both components of the ambiguous condition should be present in order
to accurately evaluate cognitive bias.
The current model presents an improved task for the evaluation of cognitive bias in
non-human animals. It overcomes a number of barriers presented by previously established
tasks. For example, by using a go/go tasks, which requires the rats to respond actively to
both the positive and negative stimuli, reduces possible confounds in the performance and
interpretation of results (Enkel et al., 2010). In addition, adopting the use of an open arena
enhances the acquisition and interpretation of the task by giving the different locations
clearly distinct values (Brydges et al., 2011; Burman et al., 2009). As a result, the present
model was successful in the evaluation of cognitive bias under acute stress, specifically in
demonstrating a pessimistic shift in cognitive bias from a baseline optimism to reflect a
negative affective state. Specifically, a key difference from previously establish tasks was
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the use of acute stress challenge instead of chronic stress exposure to examine the shift to
pessimism. The maladaptive effect of chronic stress manipulations on affective states have
been repeatedly shown in non-human animals to model human neuropsychiatric affective
disorders (e.g. Erickson, Drevets, & Schulkin, 2003). To date, few studies have examined
cognitive bias and related acute affective disturbances with visual and tactile cues in animal
models. Examining the changes in an animal’s interpretation of ambiguous stimuli during
a cognitive bias task can provide valuable information about their affective state, leading
to the development and examination of cognitive bias in a variety of species and tasks. But
despite the importance of cognitive bias in the understanding of affective changes, nonhuman studies of cognitive biases have been largely focused on the effects of chronic stress
manipulations. Studying the shifts in cognitive bias as result chronic stress manipulations
have high implications in the animal welfare field, as it allows the objective evaluation of
“affect” in captive animals. As such, the acute or single exposure of stress on behavior by
corticosterone administration have not been studied extensively. It has been shown that
acute corticosterone treatments in rats resulted in behaviours that were indicative of
anxiety, with behavioural and physiological effects that can last well after the acute stress
exposure (Mitra & Sapolsky, 2008; Skórzewska et al., 2007). This, along with the lack of
sufficient research on the shifts in cognitive bias as result of acute stress manipulations,
makes it important to examine in order to further our understanding of this complex group
of affective disorders. Thus, the current model improves upon and extends established
studies on cognitive bias by providing a method of evaluating negative cognitive bias
following acute stress challenge.
However, despite the advantages associated with the current study, a few important
limitations still exist. First, whether the animals’ responses to the ambiguous contextual
cues would change due to the repeated corticosterone injections over three days was not
accounted for. Although the novelty of the ambiguous environment was very clear on the
first testing day, it was uncertain whether this ambiguity would diminish over the course
of three testing days. As well, the repeated injections of corticosterone during the testing
stage could have also impacted the animals’ responses to the ambiguous contextual cues
either physiologically or emotionally. Adding an extinction stage to the end of testing may
help in a more accurate understanding of how an acute stress challenge can impact
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cognitive bias. Another important limitation to examine is the possibility of a changed
motivation state as result of the manipulations, for example as result of water deprivation.
Existing research have shown that 15 hours of water deprivation do not produce sufficient
stress on the animals to interfere with their performance, and that the one and a half minute
free-access to water should be sufficient to decrease any remaining stress from water
deprivation. To further reduce stress and facilitate learning, the rats were pair housed and
group trained. However, it is still unclear whether sustained daily water deprivation over
approximately three weeks may have an aversive effect on animals’ responses.
It is clear that the investigation of cognitive bias in animal models would be
conceptually and translationally beneficial to the study of affective disorders. Specifically,
negative cognitive biases have been well established as a key characteristic in depression
and other psychiatric affective disorders (Clark, Chamberlain, & Sahakian, 2009; Richter
et al., 2012). In fact, negative cognitive bias has been shown to play a key role in the
etiology, maintenance, and recurrence of depression and anxiety disorders (Beck et al.,
1979; Kloke et al., 2014). For example, when anxious individuals enter a social setting,
they tend to perceive the environment in a more negative manner, with a correspondingly
negative affective state. Such negative affect is often associated with decreased social
attention, heightened anxiety levels, poor performance in cognitive and affective tasks, and
negative ruminative thinking (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Vassilopoulos & Moberly, 2013).
Therefore, due to this prominent role of negative cognitive bias in neuropsychiatric
disorders, it can be used as a predictor of negative emotional states for the evaluation of
these disorders (Brydges et al., 2012). The availability of appropriate animal models for
examining emotional disorder interventions has great value in furthering our understanding
of human affective disorders. This is not only important on a pathophysiological level, but
also for treatments and preventions. However, due to the lack of a comprehensive
translational non-human assay for these disorders, the development of innovative
therapeutic treatments has been severely limited (Berton, Hahn, & Thase, 2012). This is
especially the case for the aforementioned depression and other affective disorders, of
which identifying novel drug targets and the evaluation of new treatments are limited by
the current availability of animal models (Stuart, Butler, Munafò, Nutt, & Robinson, 2013).
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Furthermore, specific neurological systems that have been implicated in negative
cognitive bias (i.e. endocannabinoid system and the dopaminergic system) can be explored
using this paradigm to further our understanding of affective processing (Boyer, Lecrubier,
Peuch, Dewailly, & Aubin, 1995; Che et al., 2013; Kregiel, Malek, Popik, Starowicz, &
Rygula, 2016; Schoemaker et al., 1997). Changes in endogenous neuromodulator
mechanisms were found to play a role in depression pathology (de Kloet, Joëls, &
Holsboer, 2005). For example, Kukolja et al. (2008) found that with noradrenergicglucocorticoid induced stress, the amygdala activation resulted in the shifting of cognitive
processing toward negative stimuli (Kukolja, Klingmüller, Maier, Fink, & Hurlemann,
2011). Similar results were found in an ensuing study that used pharmacologically induced
acute stress. Reboxetine (noradrenaline reuptake inhibitor) and Corticosterone
manipulations shifted rats’ responses away from optimism in a tone interpretation task that
also used reward and aversive enforcements (Enkel et al., 2010). Using c-Fos
immunoreactivity quantification, it was found that such behavioral variations in cognitive
bias were accompanied by changes in the amygdala and dentate gyrus (Enkel et al., 2010).
Therefore, these pharmacological challenges that mimic acute stress-like conditions can be
applied to the present paradigm to further investigate the underlying neuronal mechanisms
of cognitive bias. Future investigations can examine changes in behavioral outputs
accompanying acute or chronic pharmacologically elicited stress for a more accurate and
specific investigation of cognitive bias in targeted affective disorders. As well, the effect
of anti-depressants or other affective state treatments can be applied to the present model
to examine their efficacy and effectiveness.
Recent investigations have also been examining positive cognitive bias, specifically
looking at positive expectation bias, in an attempt to further understand the mechanisms
underlying affective cognition. Utilizing the link between neurohormonal regulatory
mechanisms and human/non-human social cognition, it has been found that oxytocin
administration induced positive judgement bias in dogs (Kis et al., 2015; SaphireBernstein, Way, Kim, Sherman, & Taylor, 2011; Yamasue et al., 2012). It would be
beneficial to investigate whether similar effect can be seen in rodent models. These results
suggest that the mechanisms underlying biased affective cognition may not be limited to
one neurological process, such as neuromodulators. Instead, it may be a close interplay
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between different modalities that collectively portrays affective cognition as a more
complex process than what we know thus far. Therefore, it would be advantageous for the
present paradigm to explore the effect of combining manipulations that elicit either positive
or negative cognitive bias, and then measuring whether such interplay would diminish or
increase symptoms of biased affective cognition.
Humans widely vary in how they interpret ambiguous events, as well as the extent
to which they attend to negative or positive information (Hertel & Mathews, 2011). This
phenomenon of positive and negative cognitive bias is the result of the interplay between
our emotional states and cognition. Specifically, “pessimistic” behaviours, or a negative
cognitive bias, has been found to be related to a negative emotional state. This is a core
characteristic of depression and related affective psychiatric disorders. Although cognitive
bias is well established in humans, research in translational animal model of cognitive bias
is still in its infancy, limiting the development and innovation of therapeutic treatments.
Much of the existing cognitive bias animal models studies animal welfare by using chronic
stress (e.g. unstable housing) to induce changes in animals’ affective states. Therefore, the
effect of acute stress have largely been left unexplored, but remains an important area to
study to further understand the etiology of mood disorders. The present study overcomes
this barrier by expanding the findings from previous cognitive bias animal models that
were established to assess animal affective states (Brydges et al., 2012; Burman et al.,
2009; Harding et al., 2004). These findings will be key in furthering our current
understanding of the mechanisms underlying cognitive bias. Specifically, it allows for the
examination of how a single or repeated acute stressors can impact psychological wellbeing
in nonhumans. On the other hand, it also allows for new pharmacological advancements,
as current methods to investigate depression-related behaviours (ex. Forced swim test) are
limited to assessing only existing drugs (Berton et al., 2012). Overall, the study of affective
cognition in animal models are still in its infancy. Therefore, the investigation of a novel
behavioural approach to cognitive bias, specifically examining the effect of acute stress,
would be beneficial both in the assessment of underlying mechanisms and the development
of potential innovative therapeutic treatments.
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